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Executive summary 
• Schools in England currently receive the bulk of their funding via local 
authorities, which each have their own funding formula. These 
formulae can be myriad and complex: different local authorities take 
into account different factors and fund particular types of schools 
differently. 
• School funding exhibits wide variation. Last year, most primary schools 
received between £3,000 and £6,000 per pupil, while most secondary 
schools received between £4,000 and £7,000. This variation arises 
largely because schools differ in their characteristics, but funding levels 
also vary across schools with similar characteristics. 
• In 2010–11, we find that primary schools received, on average, an 
implicit premium of about £2,000 extra for poorer pupils (defined as 
those eligible for free school meals). In secondary schools, the premium 
was roughly £3,400 extra. This system is ‘progressive’ in that schools 
with poorer pupils are funded more generously. While the 
progressivity has increased over time, schools’ finances also depend on 
historical factors, such as funding in previous years. Funding can thus 
adjust slowly to changes in pupil needs.  
• In the 2010 Spending Review, the government announced a cash-terms 
freeze in all existing funding per pupil and the creation of a pupil 
premium targeted at disadvantaged pupils. The net result is to make 
the school funding system more ‘progressive’, with the most deprived 
schools expected to see real-terms increases in funding. However, the 
majority of schools are expected to see real-terms cuts in funding.  
• The government currently intends to make significant reforms to the 
school funding system in England over the next few years. The main 
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proposal is to replace the current system with a simpler one where 
each school’s funding is calculated centrally according to a single 
national formula, with only some discretion for local authorities to vary 
funding around these levels. This would make the funding of schools 
more transparent and more consistent across the country. We analyse 
different options for a national funding formula, and how they would 
affect the finances of different schools and areas of the country. Such 
analysis was not present in the Department for Education’s most recent 
consultation on school funding reform. This Briefing Note therefore 
provides the only in-depth analysis of the implications of the proposed 
reforms to school funding.  
• The first key finding from this analysis is that the funding formula must 
be designed extremely carefully: features currently proposed by the 
government could lead to a redistribution of funding from secondary to 
primary schools. This can easily be prevented by adjusting the ratio of 
secondary to primary school funding. It is also important to recognise 
that current deprivation funding (measured by the implicit premium 
for free school meals) is geared strongly towards secondary schools.  
• Changes in funding will be concentrated in particular local authorities; 
some could see average gains or losses of 10% or more. In some cases, 
the changes amongst primary and secondary schools are offsetting, 
reflecting greater harmonisation across local authorities in the ratio of 
secondary to primary school funding. In other cases, both primary and 
secondary schools are expected to see large changes in funding. If one 
believes that a single national funding formula represents an 
appropriate system of school funding, then such local authorities would 
be deemed to be currently over- or under-funded. Alternatively, one 
might believe that such local authorities have higher or lower levels of 
educational need than those implied by the factors upon which a 
national formula might be based. 
• The third key finding is that, whatever formula is chosen, it will lead to 
a large number of winners and losers relative to existing policy. This is 
an inevitable consequence of replacing the current system, where 
funding levels can be based on myriad historical and local factors, by a 
simpler version that seeks to make funding more transparent and 
consistent across the country. 
• We consider the likely time period required to smooth the transition to 
a national funding formula. Any transition period of less than a decade 
will involve significant, sustained losses for some schools. For example, 
in a transition lasting six years, some schools would incur annual cash-
terms funding losses of up to 5%. 
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• The crucial question for the government is whether the advantages of a 
national formula – simplicity, transparency and responsiveness of 
funding – exceed the costs that the adjustment process would entail. 
However, maintaining the status quo is unlikely to be desirable either. 
Without reform, school funding may become less transparent and less 
related to educational needs over time. The fact that there will be 
winners and losers per se is not necessarily an argument against 
reform. If one believes that a national funding formula represents the 
most desirable system, then the numbers of winners and losers merely 
show how far the status quo is from an ideal scenario. Moreover, failing 
to implement substantial reforms to school funding would lead to a 
further drift away from the desirable system and a greater cost of 
implementing reform towards it in future.  
1. Introduction 
This year, the government has completed two consultations on school 
funding reform in England.1 The first set out the overall principles that 
should guide reform of school funding, emphasising the need for a simpler 
and fairer system. The second consultation made specific proposals and 
sought views on how a national funding formula for schools should be 
designed. The government is yet to publish its response to this second 
consultation.  
In this Briefing Note, we describe the options for a national funding 
formula for schools and examine how different options would affect the 
finances of different schools or areas of the country. Our analysis is based 
on data held by the Department for Education (DfE). Curiously, such 
analysis was not present in DfE’s second, more detailed, consultation on 
school funding reform. The lack of such analysis makes serious public 
debate difficult. This report therefore provides the only in-depth analysis 
of the implications of the proposed reforms to school funding. In 
presenting this analysis, our goal is to ensure that policy development and 
public debate are based on detailed and rigorous empirical evidence.  
Under the current system, schools receive the bulk of their funding via 
local authorities, which each set their own funding formula. These 
                                                      
1 Department for Education (2011), A Consultation on School Funding Reform: 
Rationale and Principles 
(http://www.education.gov.uk/consultations/downloadableDocs/School%20Funding%
20Reform%20consultation%20final.pdf). 
Department for Education (2011), A Consultation on School Funding Reform: 
Proposals for a Fairer System 
(http://www.education.gov.uk/consultations/downloadableDocs/July%2011%20Consu
ltation%20on%20School%20Funding%20Reform%20FINAL.pdf). 
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formulae can be myriad and complex. Different local authorities may take 
into account different factors, while some may fund particular types of 
schools more generously than others do. The result is that schools with 
similar characteristics, located in different areas, can have different levels 
of funding. Local authorities also fund schools on the basis of historical 
factors, which serves to dampen the relationship between a school’s 
present circumstances and its present level of funding. 
The government’s main proposal is to replace this system with a simpler 
one where each school’s funding would be calculated centrally according 
to a single national formula, with only some discretion for local authorities 
to vary funding around these levels. This would make the funding of 
schools more transparent and more consistent across the country. Such a 
reform would represent the single largest change to the school funding 
system since the introduction of the local management of schools in 1991.  
Imposing a single formula across the country can clearly create winners 
and losers: some schools would see an increase in funding while others 
would see a reduction. The government would also be choosing to 
implement this reform alongside real-terms cuts to the overall schools 
budget, limiting its ability to compensate the losers or ease the transition 
to the new system.  
The fact that there will be winners and losers is not necessarily an 
argument in itself against reform. If one believes that a national funding 
formula represents the most desirable school funding system, then the 
numbers of winners and losers merely show how far the status quo is from 
the ideal scenario. Moreover, failing to implement substantial reforms to 
school funding would lead to a further drift away from the desirable 
system and a greater cost of implementing reform towards it in future.  
Our analysis illustrates the financial implications of different options for a 
national funding formula, allowing us to consider the size of such changes 
and which options are likely to minimise the numbers of winners and 
losers. We show which schools and areas are likely to be most affected, to 
help policymakers and the public consider whether these changes are 
desirable and feasible. Furthermore, we are able to consider explicitly the 
potential transition process to such a funding formula.  
This Briefing Note proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the current 
funding system and the strength of the relationship between how much 
funding schools receive and their characteristics (such as the proportion of 
pupils from a disadvantaged background). It also documents how 
responsive school funding allocations are to changes in needs over time. 
Section 3 elaborates on the options one must consider when designing a 
national funding formula and discusses the merits of these different 
 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2011 
5
options. Section 4 contains the detailed empirical analysis, which models 
several potential examples of a national funding formula and examines 
how many schools might gain or lose, as well as the magnitudes of these 
effects. Section 5 then considers the transitional issues if such a system 
were to be implemented, examining the time frame required given the 
scale of potential disruption to school finances that a national formula 
might create. Section 6 concludes and draws together the key messages of 
this research. 
2. The current school funding system 
In this section, we describe the key features of the current school funding 
system in England and how it has evolved in recent years. Currently, there 
are two main types of state-funded schools in England – maintained 
schools and academies – which are funded in different ways. We begin by 
describing the way maintained schools are funded and then how 
academies are funded, before briefly discussing free schools. We describe 
empirically how ‘progressive’ the distribution of school funding is – that is, 
whether schools with poorer pupils receive more funding per pupil – and 
examine how the progressivity has changed over time. Finally, we assess 
the implications of previously announced changes to school funding over 
the coming years.  
2.1 Maintained schools 
Maintained schools receive the vast majority of their funding from local 
authorities, though local authorities do not raise the majority of this 
money themselves. Each year, local authorities receive an allocation from 
the Dedicated Schools Grant. Over recent years, this has been calculated 
based on the so-called ‘spend-plus’ methodology. Under this method, local 
authority grants have been determined as a flat-rate increase on what 
schools or local authorities received in the previous year, plus an extra 
increase determined on the basis of a formula. The retrospective aspect of 
this methodology limits the ability of the school funding system to 
redistribute money between local authorities on the basis of changing 
need. Although the Dedicated Schools Grant was introduced in 2006, the 
‘spend-plus’ methodology was brought in following the school funding 
‘crisis’ of 2003–04, when a number of schools complained that they were 
due to receive cuts in funding. Before then, grants to local authorities were 
based on a known formula that sought to measure the needs of different 
local authorities, though these formulae often had mechanisms aimed at 
ensuring stability in funding levels as well.  
Local authorities’ allocations from the Dedicated Schools Grant are ‘ring-
fenced’, meaning that they must be spent on pupil provision in support of a 
local authority’s schools budget. Local authorities are free to add to this 
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money using other sources, such as other grants that are not ring-fenced, 
council tax revenues and local charges for some council services. However, 
only 10% of local authorities actually do so.  
Some of this schools budget is spent on central services provided by the 
local authority, such as high-cost special educational needs and school 
admissions. This amount varies by local authority. On average, local 
authorities retain about 13% of their schools budget for central services, 
while 10% of local authorities retain less than 9% and 10% retain more 
than 17% of their schools budget.  
Each local authority then has its own ‘fair-funding’ formula for allocating 
the remainder of its schools budget to schools. This is intended to ensure 
that schools within a local authority that have similar characteristics (in 
terms of the pupils they serve) receive the same level of per-pupil funding. 
The formulae vary by local authority, but the most important element of 
them is clearly pupil numbers. Overall, the most common aspects of these 
fair-funding formulae are: 
• the number of pupils at each Key Stage; 
• indicators of social deprivation, such as the number of pupils eligible 
for free school meals (FSM); 
• Individually Assigned Resources for pupils with a statement of special 
educational needs (SEN); 
• number of pupils with SEN without a statement; 
• number of pupils with English as an additional language (EAL); 
• site and school factors (the school’s business rates bill, an amount per 
square metre of the school’s site, and many other factors). 
In recent years, local authorities have been constrained in how they set 
their formulae by a number of factors. Rules such as the Central 
Expenditure Limit have restricted the growth in spending on central 
services. Meanwhile, the Minimum Funding Guarantee (MFG) guarantees 
each school a minimum increase in funding per pupil each year. It limits 
the impact of local authorities’ fair-funding formulae, as the formula 
allocations are ignored if the annual increase in funding they imply is less 
than the level of the MFG. When it was introduced, the MFG was originally 
set at a relatively high level: in 2004–05, it was 4% per pupil in cash terms, 
constituting two-thirds of the overall cash increase in the Dedicated 
Schools Grant (6%). However, its impact has slightly reduced over time: in 
2010–11, it accounted for half of the increase in the Dedicated Schools 
Grant. The proportion of schools receiving top-up payments as a result of 
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the MFG has also fallen from around 30% of schools in 2004–05 to about 
25% in 2010–11.2  
The combination of the ‘spend-plus’ methodology and the MFG seems 
likely to have weakened the relationship between school funding levels 
and measures of educational need over time. The ‘spend-plus’ 
methodology means that local authorities’ total resources will have been 
less well targeted than could otherwise have been the case, and the MFG 
will have weakened the ability of an individual local authority’s funding 
formula to redistribute funding between schools with changing needs. This 
is an issue to which we return later in this section. 
The amount provided via fair-funding formulae is the largest single source 
of each individual school’s funding. However, over the past decade, schools 
have increasingly received funding from another source: specific grants 
calculated and distributed by central government. Local authorities have 
no say over how these are allocated. Instead, they must pass the grants on 
in full directly into schools’ bank accounts. Examples of specific grants 
include the School Standards Grant, School Development Grant and other 
standards funds.  
The operation of the school funding system, combined with differences in 
pupil characteristics across schools, creates a wide range of funding per 
pupil across schools in England. Figure 2.1 plots the distribution of per-
pupil funding in 2010–11 for (a) primary schools and (b) secondary 
schools, expressed in 2010–11 prices. It also plots the distributions for 
2006–07 (dashed lines) in order to show how they have changed over 
time. The vertical solid lines indicate the average (mean) level of funding 
in 2010–11, while the dashed vertical lines show the average level of 
funding in 2006–07. 
Both distributions exhibit a wide amount of dispersion, with 2010–11 
primary funding per pupil tending to vary between around £3,000 and 
£6,000 (with an average of £4,080), while 2010–11 secondary funding per 
pupil tends to vary between about £4,000 and £7,000 (with an average of 
£5,320).3 A small number of schools exhibit funding levels outside these 
regions. The distributions for 2010–11 lie to the right of the corresponding 
distribution for 2006–07, indicating that there was a general increase in 
real-terms funding per pupil over this period. 
                                                      
2 Dispensation can be given to derogate from the Minimum Funding Guarantee with 
the permission of the local authority Schools Forum and/or the Secretary of State. This 
applied to around 22% of schools in 2010–11. 
3 The median primary funding per pupil is £3,840, while the median secondary funding 
per pupil is £4,760. 
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Figure 2.1. Empirical distribution of funding per pupil in 2006–07 and 2010–11 
a) Primary schools 
 
b) Secondary schools 
 
Notes: Estimated amounts are in 2010–11 prices using the GDP deflator. The vertical lines indicate the mean level of 
funding in the relevant year. 
Sources: School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. GDP deflators are from Office for Budget 
Responsibility, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2011 (http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/economic-
and-fiscal-outlook-march-2011/). 
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In previous work,4 we analysed which pupil characteristics (implicitly) 
explain the largest proportions of schools’ funding. We have repeated this 
exercise here, using statistical techniques to isolate the impact of various 
school-level characteristics on their overall level of funding. Here, we 
highlight some of the key conclusions from this analysis (see Appendix 
Tables A.1 and A.2 for the full results). We focus on funding for pre-16 
education, thereby excluding funding for sixth forms from the Learning 
and Skills Council.  
When examining all funding for primary and secondary schools, we see 
that it is highly skewed towards schools with greater numbers of pupils 
with SEN (particularly if they have a statement5) and towards schools with 
greater numbers of pupils from deprived backgrounds. On average, there 
was an implicit FSM premium of about £2,000 for primary schools and 
£3,400 for secondary schools in 2010–11. This would be on top of the 
basic amounts provided for all pupils, meaning that we estimate that in 
2010–11 primary schools receive 83% extra funding for each pupil eligible  
 
Figure 2.2. Implicit FSM premium over time  
 
Notes: Estimated amounts are in 2010–11 prices using the GDP deflator. Years are academic years, e.g. 2005 means 
2005–06. 
Sources: School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. GDP deflators are from Office for Budget 
Responsibility, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2011 (http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/economic-
and-fiscal-outlook-march-2011/). 
                                                      
4 H. Chowdry, A. Muriel and L. Sibieta (2008), Level Playing Field? The Implications of 
School Funding, Research Paper, Reading: CfBT Education Trust 
(http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/4252). 
H. Chowdry, E. Greaves and L. Sibieta (2010), The Pupil Premium: Assessing the 
Options, Commentary 113, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/4776). 
5 A statement of special educational needs is coordinated between the local authority, 
parents and the school. The statement sets out the level of provision needed for the 
pupil, and consequently determines how much extra funding they require. 
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for FSM compared with a pupil who is not, and secondary schools receive 
an extra 96% of funding per pupil eligible for FSM.  
As Figure 2.2 makes clear, these implicit FSM premiums have grown 
substantially since 2005–06, from £1,100 to £2,000 in primary schools and 
from £1,600 to £3,400 in secondary schools (all in 2010–11 prices), 
doubling in real terms in just five years. This is far in excess of overall 
growth in funding per pupil over this period; school funding has certainly 
become more targeted at more deprived schools over recent years.  
Figure 2.3 confirms that the implicit basic amount per pupil has grown by 
far less than the implicit FSM premium over the past five years. It also 
separates out the contribution to these basic amounts from local 
authorities’ fair-funding formulae and from central government specific 
grants. It shows that specific grants from central government contribute 
significantly more to the implicit FSM premium than to the implicit basic 
amount provided for all pupils. Specific grants have driven much of the 
growth in the implicit FSM premium in recent years, though fair-funding 
formulae have also become more targeted at deprived schools. Overall, the 
use of specific grants has made the school funding system more 
progressive in recent years.  
In previous analysis,6 we have shown that local authorities’ funding 
formulae are less targeted at deprivation than the allocations they receive 
from the Dedicated Schools Grant. In other words, local authorities seem to 
spread or ‘flatten’ the funding they receive for deprived pupils, 
distributing it across all the pupils in the area. Specific grants from central 
government may have been devised in response to such flattening. 
However, it is clear from Figure 2.3 that the estimated implicit FSM 
premium in local authority funding formulae has grown faster than the 
estimated implicit basic amount. This means the degree of flattening has 
fallen over time. 
The above analysis only shows the average amount of funding associated 
with particular school characteristics in any given year, which masks two 
key points. First, in reality there is likely to be variation around these 
averages as different local authorities prioritise different factors. Second, 
the analysis so far does not show the degree to which changes in funding 
over time are associated with changes in a school’s characteristics, i.e. how 
responsive school funding is to any change in the needs of the school. We 
now seek to address both of these issues.  
                                                      
6 H. Chowdry, E. Greaves and L. Sibieta (2010), The Pupil Premium: Assessing the 
Options, Commentary 113, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/4776). 
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Figure 2.3. Implicit basic amount and FSM premium over time, by source  
a) Primary schools 
 
b) Secondary schools 
 
Notes: Estimated amounts are in 2010–11 prices using the GDP deflator. Years are academic years, e.g. 2005 means 
2005–06. 
Sources: School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics are taken from LEASIS 
(Local Education Authority and School Information Service). GDP deflators are from Office for Budget Responsibility, 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2011 (http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/economic-and-fiscal-
outlook-march-2011/). 
Figure 2.4 shows the percentage difference between schools’ actual 
funding levels and what they would be predicted to receive based on their 
observable characteristics (including the characteristics of their pupils). 
This is shown separately for (a) primary schools and (b) secondary 
schools. Each graph shows how this pattern has changed between 2005–
06 (grey line) and 2010–11 (black line).  
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Figure 2.4. Percentage difference between schools’ actual and predicted funding  
a) Primary schools 
 
b) Secondary schools 
 
Note: Estimated amounts are in 2010–11 prices using the GDP deflator. 
Sources: School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics are taken from LEASIS 
(Local Education Authority and School Information Service). GDP deflators are from Office for Budget Responsibility, 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2011 (http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/economic-and-fiscal-
outlook-march-2011/). 
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in 2005–06. About 65% of secondary schools in 2010–11 had funding 
levels within 5% of what would be predicted based on their observable 
characteristics, compared with 72% in 2005–06. Primary schools exhibit a 
similar pattern. 
In other words, schools in similar circumstances can have quite different 
funding levels. As we might expect, given the operation of the ‘spend-plus’ 
methodology and the Minimum Funding Guarantee, these differences have 
grown since 2005–06. However, they were significant even then. This 
situation could lead to a number of policy conclusions.  
First, one could conclude that this shows just how far the status quo is 
from a simple, national funding formula, and confirms the need for reform 
if a single national formula is believed to be ideal. Since these differences 
have grown over time, this interpretation would suggest that the case for 
reform has also grown over time. Alternatively, one could conclude that 
the current level of these differences simply reflects the different choices 
currently made by local authorities. However, at least some of the increase 
in these differences over time will reflect the MFG and the ‘spend-plus’ 
methodology. Thus some schools’ and local authorities’ funding levels will 
have drifted away from their appropriate level and so there is still a need 
to reform the allocation of funding to local authorities at the very least. The 
implications for reform thus depend on the degree to which one believes 
that existing differences across similar schools reflect local discretion or 
unnecessary inequality. But either interpretation would suggest a need to 
reform the school funding system.  
A school’s level of funding may be strongly related to the characteristics of 
its pupils at a point in time, but, as mentioned above, there are also 
important retrospective factors at play. Therefore it does not necessarily 
follow that school funding levels respond quickly to changes in need; 
funding can instead be slow to adjust.  
To see how responsive the current system is to changes in need, Figure 2.5 
plots the estimated implicit premiums that result when the change in a 
school’s funding level is related to the change in its characteristics from 
one year to the next. The grey bars show the implicit basic amount and 
implicit FSM premium, for both primary and secondary schools, based on 
the change between 2009–10 and 2010–11 (expressed in 2010–11 
prices).7 For the purposes of comparison, the black bars show the implicit 
basic amount and implicit FSM premium when looking at the relationship 
between current school funding (in 2010–11) and current school 
                                                      
7 See Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4 for the full set of estimated amounts. 
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characteristics. The black FSM premium bars therefore use the same 
figures as those for the implicit FSM premium (for 2010–11) in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.5 demonstrates that the relationship between changes in funding 
and changes in need is systematically weaker than the relationship 
between the level of funding and the level of need. Secondary schools 
currently get an implicit basic amount of just over £3,500 per pupil, but if a 
school’s intake rises by one pupil from one year to the next, it will only 
receive an extra £1,650. Secondary schools with poorer pupils receive a 
significant implicit premium for pupils with FSM (£3,400), but if the 
degree of deprivation rises at a particular school, the resulting increase in 
funding will only be around two-thirds of this. In other words, while 
schools with more pupils or more deprived pupils have considerably more 
funding than other schools, if the same schools experienced an increase in 
the number of such pupils from one year to the next, their funding would 
only increase by a small amount. 
Figure 2.5. Responsiveness of school funding to changes in pupil numbers or 
deprivation 
 
Note: Estimated amounts are in 2010–11 prices using the GDP deflator. 
Sources: School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics are taken from LEASIS 
(Local Education Authority and School Information Service). GDP deflators are from Office for Budget Responsibility, 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2011 (http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/economic-and-fiscal-
outlook-march-2011/). 
In principle, a national funding formula would remove this disparity by 
replacing the historical aspects of school allocations with an explicit, 
concrete link between their current circumstances and their current level 
of funding. However, doing so could also introduce some volatility in 
school funding levels as a school’s characteristics evolve over time. There 
is an inherent trade-off between the responsiveness and the stability of 
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school funding levels. In Section 5, we revisit the issue of potential 
volatility in school funding levels when considering the transition to a 
national funding formula. 
2.2 Academies 
Academies operate outside of local authority control and are funded 
directly by the DfE via the Young People’s Learning Agency (YPLA). The 
YPLA provides a grant to all academies known as the General Annual 
Grant.8 The intention is that academies should receive the same funding as 
maintained schools with similar pupils in the same local authority. 
Although this sounds like a simple principle, the mechanics are 
considerably more complex. First, the YPLA does not know the precise 
formulae used by local authorities to distribute money to schools, and has 
previously attempted to replicate these formulae based on published 
information. As the government acknowledged in the consultation on 
academies’ funding published earlier this year,9 ‘There is a risk of error 
during the replication process [and] ... the process becomes more difficult 
with an increasing number of Academies’. In the immediate term, the 
government thus plans to roll forward current per-pupil funding in 
academies. This circumvents the difficulty of having to replicate local 
authority fair-funding formulae. However, if continued indefinitely, it 
would create a financial incentive for academies to admit fewer 
disadvantaged pupils over time and would provide fewer extra resources 
to academies that became more deprived over time as compared with 
maintained schools. An exception to this is the new pupil premium, which 
will be paid on top of current funding. However, it is considerably smaller 
than the implicit amount targeted at deprived pupils in existing funding.  
The second complication is that, being independent of local authorities, 
academies no longer benefit from the provision of central services by the 
local authority. Instead, academies also receive funding to cover the cost of 
providing these services themselves. This income is known as the Local 
Authority Central Spend Equivalent Grant (LACSEG). It is calculated by 
taking the average amount spent per pupil by the local authority on central 
services and is allocated to academies on a per-pupil basis. Overall, 
therefore, academies receive higher levels of funding than similar 
maintained schools in the same local authority, but in return have 
                                                      
8 Academies are also provided with grants to cover VAT, insurance, rates and other 
costs not encountered by maintained schools.  
9 Department for Education (2011), Academies’ Pre-16 Funding: Options for the 
2012/13 Academic Year 
(http://www.education.gov.uk/consultations/downloadableDocs/Academies%20Fundi
ng%20Consultation%20Document.pdf).  
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responsibility for the provision of more services. The LACSEG only 
provides academies with a net increase in their effective resources if they 
are able to provide the required services more efficiently than the local 
authority does, or if their usage of central services was below average for 
the local authority. Conversely, if academies are less capable of providing 
these services efficiently (perhaps due to an inability to exploit economies 
of scale) then they would have less effective resources than similar 
maintained schools.  
2.3 Free schools 
In addition to expanding the number of academies over time, the 
government has also enabled the creation of free schools, inspired by the 
popularity of such schools in Sweden. Free schools are set up and managed 
by parents and other non-state providers, and need to demonstrate local 
demand before they are approved by central government. They are also 
independent of central and local government. Twenty-four free schools 
opened in September 2011, with more planned for September 2012 and 
beyond.  
Like academies, free schools receive their funding directly from central 
government. Until recently, the funding has mainly covered start-up and 
pre-opening costs. As of September 2011, free schools also receive 
revenue funding to cover teacher salaries and other day-to-day costs. The 
formula used to allocate such funding to free schools aims to provide the 
same level of funding to free schools as is provided to similar maintained 
schools in the same local area, in a simple and transparent manner. Each 
free school receives funding on the following basis: 
• a fixed sum of £95,000 for each primary or all-through school; 
• a basic local funding unit for each pupil attending the school; 
• a local funding unit for each pupil eligible for FSM; 
• an additional national pupil premium for each pupil eligible for FSM; 
• a LACSEG and SEN grant (like academies, free schools are responsible 
for services previously provided by the local authority); 
• separately calculated funding for sixth-form pupils; 
• a grant to cover the cost of insurance and rates. 
The basic local funding unit and the local funding unit for FSM pupils are 
calculated based on estimates of the current balance of funding between 
primary and secondary schools implied by local authority funding 
formulae, and the current level of funding targeted at deprivation by local 
authorities, respectively. The size of the LACSEG and SEN grant is 
determined on the same basis as for academies. Since the formula for free 
school funding differs across local authorities, free schools with similar 
characteristics that are located in different local authorities may receive 
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different levels of funding. This is the result of existing differences in local 
authority funding formulae and the Department’s desire that free schools 
be funded on a similar basis to other state-funded schools in the same local 
authority.  
It is not currently possible to analyse free schools’ funding levels as they 
have only recently opened and the required information does not exist. 
However, in Section 4.4, we will analyse the implications of using the free 
school funding formula to determine funding for maintained schools. This 
will allow us to judge whether the free school funding formula is more or 
less generous – and if so, for which types of school – than the current 
funding formula for maintained schools.  
2.4 Changes to school funding in 2011–12 and by 2014–15 
The government has made a number of changes to the way in which school 
funding is provided in 2011–12, and has further plans for changes over the 
following three years. The main changes introduced in 2011–12 are the 
streamlining of specific grants provided to schools and the introduction of 
a pupil premium. In the 2010 Spending Review,10 the government 
announced that existing spending per pupil (the Dedicated Schools Grant 
plus streamlined specific grants) would be frozen in cash terms in 2011–
12.  
The pupil premium will provide schools with a fixed extra amount of 
money for each deprived or otherwise disadvantaged pupil. This will add 
to the already considerable amount of funding attached to deprived pupils 
(about £3,400 at secondary schools and £2,000 at primary schools). A 
pupil premium could: (i) simplify the current system; (ii) weight funding 
even more towards disadvantaged pupils; and (iii) make school funding 
levels respond more quickly as the make-up of schools’ student bodies 
changes. In the long run, the government has stated that the pupil 
premium should become the primary mechanism for distributing all 
deprivation funding to schools and would therefore replace all current 
deprivation funding.  
In 2011–12, the pupil premium is set at £488 for each pupil eligible for 
free school meals, £488 for each child in care and £200 for children in 
service families.11 In total, it is expected to cost £625 million in 2011–12. 
                                                      
10 See http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spend_index.htm. 
11 http://www.education.gov.uk/inthenews/inthenews/a00199131/schools-to-get-
even-more-pupil-premium-cash-this-year. 
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In previous work,12 we have analysed the implications of these policy 
decisions for the budgets of schools across England in 2011–12. We 
showed that whether one considers economy-wide inflation or an estimate 
of schools-specific cost inflation, the majority of primary and secondary 
schools are expected to see real-terms cuts in per-pupil funding in 2011–
12; only the most deprived ones would expect to see a real-terms increase.  
The pupil premium will be gradually expanded over time, with a total 
budget of £2.5 billion available in 2014–15 as set out in the 2010 Spending 
Review. This would equate to £1,900 for each pupil eligible for FSM in 
2014–15 (leaving £110 million for an expanded pupil premium for 
children in care or in service families). In our previous work, we also 
estimated changes in funding per pupil across schools in 2014–15; Figure 
2.6 reproduces this analysis.13 It shows the percentages of primary and 
secondary schools expected to see cash-terms funding increases between 
2010–11 and 2014–15 of a given value or less, assuming that existing per-
pupil funding is frozen in cash terms and that the pupil premium is  
 
Figure 2.6. Change in school funding levels in cash terms in 2014–15 
 
Sources: School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics are taken from LEASIS 
(Local Education Authority and School Information Service) and National Pupil Database. GDP deflators are from Office 
for Budget Responsibility, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2011 
(http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/economic-and-fiscal-outlook-march-2011/). 
                                                      
12 H. Chowdry and L. Sibieta (2011), Trends in Education and Schools Spending, 
Briefing Note 121, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/5732). 
13 It should be noted that Figure 2.6 uses more up-to-date data than those used in 
Chowdry and Sibieta (2011) – referenced in footnote 12. The specific numbers thus 
differ very slightly, but the overall pattern is largely unchanged.  
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increased to £1,900 by 2014–15. It also shows the expected rate of 
cumulative economy-wide inflation over this period (11.2%, shown by the 
vertical black line) and an estimate of cumulative schools-specific cost 
inflation (8.4%, shown by the dashed line).  
The graph shows that nearly three-quarters of primary schools would see 
an increase in funding below economy-wide inflation between 2010–11 
and 2014–15, as would 90% of secondary schools. Around two-thirds of 
primary schools and 80% of secondary schools would see real-terms cuts, 
measured against our estimate of schools-specific inflation. About half of 
primary schools are likely to receive cash-terms increases at least 5 
percentage points below economy-wide inflation, as are over 60% of 
secondary schools. As a result of the pupil premium, about 3% of 
secondary schools will see increases at least 5 percentage points higher 
than inflation, as will over 10% of primary schools.  
2.5 Conclusion 
While the level of funding schools receive has increased in recent years, it 
exhibits very wide variation. To a large extent, this is because schools 
differ in their characteristics: those with a larger proportion of 
disadvantaged or high-needs pupils tend to be funded more generously. 
However, there is still considerable variation in funding levels across 
schools with similar characteristics, because (i) different local authorities 
use different fair-funding formulae and (ii) funding reforms such as the 
Minimum Funding Guarantee have led to the budgets in some schools 
diverging from what might be expected based on the school’s observable 
characteristics. This variation in funding levels across schools with similar 
characteristics has grown since 2005.  
While we do not know the actual formulae that determine how much 
funding schools receive, it is clear that two of the largest determinants of 
funding are the headcount of pupils and the number of disadvantaged 
pupils. We find that primary schools tend to receive, on average, a 
premium for pupils eligible for FSM of about £2,000 more than for a non-
eligible pupil. In secondary schools, the premium is roughly £3,400. These 
implicit premiums have grown in recent years, making the allocation of 
school funding increasingly progressive. However, school finances also 
depend on historical factors, such as funding received in previous years. 
An explicit, transparent formula would ensure that funding levels respond 
immediately to changes in need. 
These conclusions suggest that the school funding system is in need of 
reform. However, the nature of this reform depends on what the ideal 
school funding system looks like in principle. If one believes that a single 
national funding formula represents an ideal system, then there was a 
strong case for reform in 2005 and this case has grown stronger over time. 
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If, on the other hand, one believes that local authorities should have the 
freedom to prioritise different factors, then there is simply a need to 
rebase local authority allocations on more recent measures of educational 
need.  
By introducing a pupil premium targeted at the most disadvantaged 
children, the government has made the school funding system even more 
progressive from 2011–12. However, due to a cash freeze in other per-
pupil funding, only the most deprived schools will see real-terms increases 
in funding per pupil. The majority are expected to see real-terms cuts in 
2011–12. This will also be true in 2014–15, despite the planned expansion 
of the pupil premium. 
3. Designing a national funding formula for schools 
In this section, we discuss options for the design of a national funding 
formula, paying particular attention to the proposals set out in the most 
recent consultation on school funding. We begin by discussing the overall 
structure of a national funding formula, before discussing the potential 
content of the formula (for example, number of pupils, measure of 
deprivation and other factors).  
3.1 Overall structure of national funding formula 
There are many different ways to structure a national funding formula. 
The simplest possible one would involve a fixed monetary amount for all 
pupils, potentially different for primary and secondary schools. This would 
essentially be a pure voucher system (except that schools would not be 
able to charge top-up fees). As a slight modification, one could choose to 
allocate extra funding for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds. This 
could reduce any disincentives to attract such pupils by providing 
additional resources to schools with large numbers of disadvantaged 
pupils. This is one of the motivations behind the pupil premium.  
A further modification could be to allow for non-pupil-led factors. For 
instance, schools in high-cost areas might need to pay more to attract 
teachers and could thus be funded at a higher level. Further considerations 
could include whether to provide additional support to small schools via 
lump-sum amounts. 
In principle, a national funding formula could take into account many 
different pupil-led and non-pupil-led factors. Crucially, however, it would 
be set by central government and the funding would be allocated directly 
to schools according to this formula; the allocation would no longer be 
determined by local authorities. The separate formulae used by local 
authorities would be replaced by a single one, representing a very 
substantial reform to the school funding system.  
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An alternative structure involves using a formula to determine funding 
levels for local authorities and leaving local authorities to set their own 
formula to pass the funding on to schools. This is not a true national 
funding formula. Instead, it would represent a return to the early 2000s, 
when local authorities were funded on the basis of a known formula but 
chose how to allocate funding to schools in their area. 
The relative merits of these two structures depend on whether one feels 
that local or central government has a better idea of educational needs 
across schools, and the extent to which one is prepared to accept 
differences in funding across similar schools in different areas. Their 
merits will also depend on the desired structure of the overall schooling 
system. A ‘true’ single national funding formula would be better suited to a 
market-based system with many independent providers, whereas the 
second structure would be suited to a model that envisages a substantial 
role for local authorities. However, in the short run, one must also consider 
the costs of moving to a new funding system: replacing all local authorities’ 
fair-funding formulae with a single formula is likely to involve substantial 
numbers of winners and losers. This is an issue to which we return in 
Section 4.  
In its most recent consultation on school funding, the government 
proposed two options for a national funding formula somewhere in 
between the two structures discussed above. In its first option, the 
government would calculate the allocations for individual schools based 
on the characteristics of the pupils, schools and the local area. In 
particular, the new formula would include: 
• a basic amount per pupil; 
• additional funding for deprivation; 
• additional funding to protect small schools; 
• an adjustment for areas with higher labour costs. 
Local authorities would receive the total allocation across all maintained 
schools in their area. They could pass this on to schools, or deviate at their 
discretion by prioritising certain factors in their own formula or using 
different factors. However, the degree to which local authorities could 
deviate from the school-level allocations in the central government 
formula would be restricted (see below for further details).  
The government’s second option involves a national formula for allocating 
funds to local authorities (rather than schools), which would then be 
responsible for choosing how to allocate these funds to the maintained 
schools in their area. This is very similar to the current system and the 
second structure discussed above, with the important exception that there 
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would be further restrictions on the factors local authorities could use in 
their formulae. 
In either case, the changes would not be in place until at least 2013–14. In 
2012–13, a shadow settlement will be published to indicate what school 
budgets would be had the formula been introduced in 2012–13.  
In principle, the two options are identical in terms of how funds are 
allocated to local authorities. If the government believed that the 
allocations to local authorities under the first option were optimal, then it 
is difficult to see why these would not also be optimal under the second 
option. The key question therefore is whether it is appropriate to publish 
school-level allocations, as would happen under the first option. It is hard 
to see why this should not be done if government feels that these 
represent fair and logical funding levels. Either way, local authorities 
would have some freedom to deviate from these allocations and would 
need to justify doing so to their Schools Forum (and, ultimately, local 
voters).  
We now turn to the potential content of the formula restrictions on local 
authorities. In particular, we discuss: 
• the basic amounts provided for all pupils; 
• the pupil premium and deprivation funding; 
• adjustments for small schools; 
• adjustment for labour costs across areas; 
• SEN funding; 
• spending by local authorities on central services; 
• academies and free schools. 
3.2 Basic amount 
The most important element of any national funding formula would be the 
basic amount allocated for each pupil. In the current system, Age Weighted 
Pupil Units (AWPUs) determine the basic amounts allocated to schools for 
pupils falling into different age groups – Key Stage 1 (ages 5–7), Key Stage 
3 (ages 11–14) and Key Stage 4 (ages 14–16) – as a multiple of the funding 
received for pupils at Key Stage 2 (ages 7–11).  
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the amount of current variation in these ratios 
across local authorities (note that the AWPU for Key Stage 2 is 1.0 in every 
local authority; the other AWPUs are always relative to this). The grey bars 
indicate the average AWPU level across all local authorities, while the 
black markers indicate the 10th and 90th percentiles in 2010–11. On 
average, schools receive 50% more funding for pupils aged 14–16 than for 
pupils aged 7–11. At the extreme end of the scale, some schools receive 
70% more funding for such pupils. 
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Figure 3.1. Current AWPU ratios, 2010–11 
 
Source: Benchmarking tables of LA planned expenditure: 2010–11 
(http://www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/strategy/financeandfunding/section251/a0069747/benchmark
ing-2010-11). 
A national funding formula would need to set monetary values for these 
AWPU factors. If it is not intended to redistribute funding from secondary 
to primary schools compared with the current system, then a national 
funding formula would need to allocate higher amounts of basic funding to 
secondary schools. However, a government may well wish to alter the 
distribution of such funding in favour of primary schools on the grounds of 
early intervention. The main argument in favour of higher funding for 
secondary schools would be the higher costs associated with secondary 
teaching – for example, the breadth of subjects and the materials required.  
The most recent consultation did not set out a preferred value for AWPU 
factors. Instead it simply argued that there should be greater 
harmonisation in total funding per pupil across the country. The 
government proposed that local authorities should work towards 
providing 27% more funding for secondary school pupils than for primary 
school pupils. However, instead of stipulating 1.27 as an exact target, the 
consultation proposed a range of permissible ratios around 1.27, as a 
compromise. The width of this range has not been determined; there is 
clearly a trade-off between the degree of harmonisation achieved and the 
number of local authorities that must alter their relative funding levels. 
Figure 3.2 plots the current level of the ratio between secondary and 
primary school funding for each local authority in England (represented by 
the vertical grey bars, ordered from highest to lowest). The solid black line 
marks the ratio that the government believes local authorities should 
converge towards (1.27). It is very clear from the graph that in a  
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Figure 3.2. Ratio of funding between secondary and primary stages, 2010–11 
 
Source: Benchmarking tables of LA planned expenditure: 2010–11 
(http://www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/strategy/financeandfunding/section251/a0069747/benchmark
ing-2010-11). 
significant number of local authorities the ratio differs noticeably from the 
national average.  
To comply with any eventual range of values, local authorities would need 
to calculate the ratio of total funding per secondary pupil to total funding 
per primary pupil, adjusting their formulae accordingly if the ratio is 
outside the allowed range. The consultation did not make clear whether 
local authorities with a funding ratio outside this range should adjust their 
AWPUs or some other aspect of funding in order to reach the target range. 
Either way, the government needs to specify recommended basic amounts 
or AWPU values (based on some sort of central measure across England) 
in any school-level funding formula, or the range of allowable ratios 
between total per-pupil funding at secondary and primary schools.  
3.3 Deprivation funding 
The next key aspect of any national funding formula is deprivation 
funding. Local authorities have hitherto used a range of deprivation 
measures in their fair-funding formulae, and in 2011–12 the pupil 
premium was added to these. In the longer term, the government aims to 
provide all deprivation funding through the pupil premium, which will 
make the nominated measure of deprivation extremely important. In the 
most recent consultation, a number of alternatives were proposed: 
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• the number of pupils currently eligible for FSM; 
• the number of pupils who have ever been eligible for FSM over the last 
three or six years; 
• an area-based measure of the receipt of means-tested benefits; 
• the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI), an area-based 
measure of the proportion of children in relative poverty. 
The primary aim of a pupil premium is to narrow the achievement gap 
between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils; it should thus be targeted 
towards groups experiencing disadvantage. Previous IFS research14 has 
considered the merits of different potential measures of deprivation. While 
it is important to remember that there is no objectively correct answer to 
the question of which is the ideal indicator, three characteristics of a good 
deprivation measure can be identified. It should be: 
• highly correlated with disadvantage;  
• difficult to manipulate by schools or pupils;  
• easily observable.  
FSM eligibility is the most widely used indicator of disadvantage for school 
children. In addition, schools should not, in principle, be able to falsely 
declare pupils as eligible for FSM, as eligibility is based on the receipt of 
certain means-tested benefits. FSM eligibility is also easily observable in 
publicly-available administrative data. However, it is a rather blunt 
measure that cannot identify multiple degrees of deprivation. Also, a 
disadvantage of the rules determining FSM eligibility is that they lead to 
schools receiving extra funding for children from poor non-working 
families but not for children from poor working families. 
One issue with the use of current FSM eligibility as a pupil-level 
deprivation measure is that it will include pupils whose family is 
temporarily poor, perhaps due to fluctuations in income or employment. 
The retrospective measures based on FSM that the consultation proposed 
(whether a pupil has ever been eligible over the last three or six years) 
would exacerbate this issue, by including children who have been 
temporarily poor in previous years as well as those who are temporarily 
poor this year. While it is not clear what the ideal form of FSM eligibility to 
use is, it is clear that retrospective measures of FSM eligibility are less 
targeted: they would cover a greater number of pupils and therefore lead 
to the pupil premium being spread out more thinly. Schools would 
consequently get less money for pupils in persistent poverty, who might 
                                                      
14 H. Chowdry, E. Greaves and L. Sibieta (2010), The Pupil Premium: Assessing the 
Options, Commentary 113, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/4776). 
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face greater barriers to learning and achievement. A pupil premium based 
on retrospective FSM eligibility would also be less progressive than one 
based on current FSM eligibility (especially for primary schools). It is 
noteworthy that the consultation did not propose allocating the pupil 
premium solely on the basis of persistent eligibility for FSM over a number 
of years. We believe this measure warrants some consideration as it would 
enable schools to receive more generous financial support for the smaller 
group of pupils who have experienced severe and persistent deprivation 
(although schools can always choose to spend this money as they wish). 
The two area-based measures of deprivation – means-tested benefit 
receipt and the IDACI – are correlated with disadvantage (educational and 
material), are easy to observe and are difficult to falsify. They are also well 
understood and publicly available. Unlike FSM eligibility, these measures 
are continuous and can reflect a wide range of levels of disadvantage. They 
also reflect deprivation as a whole, not just out-of-work deprivation. 
However, area-based indicators are relatively broad, measuring the 
circumstances of a pupil’s neighbourhood rather than of the pupil 
themselves. Not every single child living in a deprived area will be 
disadvantaged, and not every single disadvantaged pupil will live in a 
deprived area. 
A national funding formula could also allocate funding on the basis of the 
number of pupils who have English as an additional language. It would 
make sense to include this additional factor if pupils with EAL require 
more support than non-EAL pupils, even after taking into account 
disadvantage factors such as FSM eligibility. However, deciding which 
pupils have EAL is in practice open to some interpretation by schools. The 
explicit use of an EAL factor in a national funding formula could incentivise 
the over-reporting of EAL in order for schools to receive extra money.  
3.4 Lump sum for small schools 
The government has also proposed an allowance to help small primary 
schools with certain fixed costs that do not vary with incremental changes 
in pupil numbers. In small schools, pupil-led funding may not be sufficient 
to cover such costs. To alleviate this, the consultation proposed a £95,000 
lump sum for every primary school. The smallest ones would benefit the 
most because their funding per pupil would increase the most. 
It makes sense to give this lump sum to all primary schools rather than 
only the small ones, to avoid ‘cliff edges’. However, the proposal to provide 
this amount only to primary schools does create an issue. The consultation 
document argued that secondary schools should not require a fixed lump 
sum, because the fixed costs that might be an issue (such as school 
transport) are funded from the local authority Formula Grant. However, 
the empirical analysis in Section 4 reveals that providing a lump sum only 
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for primary schools, combined with the consultation’s suggested 
secondary:primary ratio of 1.27, would substantially benefit primary 
schools while penalising secondary schools. The government may have a 
preference for this outcome, but this was not articulated in the 
consultation. If such redistribution is not an aim of the reforms, one or 
both of these elements would have to be revised. We analyse such 
alternatives in Section 4.  
3.5 Adjustment for local labour costs 
The fourth key element of the national funding formula is an Area Cost 
Adjustment (ACA) to reflect differences in labour costs across local 
authorities. This is already present in the funding that local authorities 
receive, but the government has stated that the ACA has certain 
weaknesses in its current form and warrants modification. 
The current ACA methodology is based on estimates of the differences in 
wages and salaries across local authorities. These differences are then 
used as ACA factors. The method is known as the General Labour Market 
(GLM) approach because the ACA uplift for each local authority is 
determined by the general level of wages in that area. It is the appropriate 
uplift to apply if local authorities have to compete with other employers 
(including the private sector) to recruit staff. If schools were free to set 
salaries for teaching staff in a competitive manner, then the GLM approach 
would be the best way of calculating adjustments for labour costs. 
However, a national pay structure for teachers exists, which may 
undermine the assumption upon which the GLM method relies. There is 
some variation across the country in salaries at each pay grade to reflect 
regional differences in living costs, but this is not properly aligned with the 
variation in the ACA, leading to certain anomalies. A handful of Outer 
London boroughs pay Inner London weighting in teacher salaries while 
receiving the Outer London ACA (which is less than the Inner London 
ACA). Schools in such areas are effectively penalised compared with 
schools in Inner London, which pay the same teacher salaries but receive 
more generous funding. 
One way to reform the ACA would be to base the uplifts on the actual costs 
of recruiting and employing staff, known as the Specific Costs approach. 
Unfortunately, while there is good information on the direct costs of 
employing teachers, there is a lack of reliable data on the indirect costs 
and on the costs of employing non-teaching staff. 
The consultation thus proposed a hybrid approach for calculating the ACA. 
This would involve the Specific Costs approach to calculate uplift for the 
direct costs of teaching staff and the GLM approach to calculate uplift for 
all other costs. The two uplifts would be averaged to create a new 
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combined ACA uplift. The consultation published estimates of proposed 
ACA uplifts under the combined approach and under an updated GLM 
approach (using the most recent data). Figure 3.3 illustrates the average 
impact at the regional level of each methodology. 
Figure 3.3. Regional impact of changes to ACA methodology 
 
Source: Department for Education (2011), A Consultation on School Funding Reform: Rationale and Principles 
(http://www.education.gov.uk/consultations/downloadableDocs/School%20Funding%20Reform%20consultation%20fi
nal.pdf). 
Local authorities in the North East, along with many in the East Midlands 
and Yorkshire & the Humber, would be relatively unaffected by the 
proposed new ACA factors. The updated GLM approach would increase the 
generosity with which areas in London and the South East are funded 
relative to the rest of England. The combined approach, however, would 
reduce the ACA uplift in the East of England, Inner London and the South 
East – but not in Outer London, which would benefit very slightly (due to 
the realignment of its ACA uplift with teacher salary levels). Overall, the 
updated GLM approach would essentially compound the pattern in the 
current ACA factors, while the combined approach would reduce the 
uplifts that well-resourced areas enjoy over the rest of the country. 
In a world where schools are bound by a national teacher pay structure, 
the combined approach appears to be a sensible compromise or ‘second-
best’, given that schools cannot compete financially for teachers. An 
alternative justification for the GLM approach, from which areas such as 
Inner London and the South East benefit considerably, is that schools in 
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such areas face the greatest difficulties in attracting and retaining teachers. 
If true, this would suggest that teachers in such areas are simply 
underpaid, in which case the situation is best addressed via the teacher 
pay structure rather than the ACA methodology.  
3.6 High-needs pupils 
Any reforms to school funding would also need to make clear how funding 
will be provided for pupils with high needs or with special educational 
needs. Currently, local authorities vary in the way funds are allocated for 
children with SEN. Under the most common model, some funds are 
provided to meet the needs of children with low-level SEN, often on the 
basis of proxy indicators such as the proportion of children eligible for 
FSM. Beyond that, schools (and parents) must apply to the local authority 
for additional resources to meet the needs of children with statements of 
SEN. Such funding is tied to specific provision and resources for individual 
pupils, and is therefore referred to as Individually Assigned Resources.  
Previous research15 has demonstrated that the current funding system for 
children with SEN creates a number of different incentives. First, schools 
and parents have an aligned incentive to request additional resources 
from local authorities for pupils with statements of SEN. On the other 
hand, local authorities have a finite resource and may have an incentive to 
under-provide for individual pupils. However, when it comes to funds that 
are delegated to schools for children with SEN, there is potential for 
disagreement between parents and schools.  
In its consultation, the government defined high-needs pupils as those 
whose total support costs more than £10,000 annually. Most of these 
pupils seem likely to have a statement of SEN. The consultation also 
proposed to provide schools with any additional support for high-needs 
pupils required above the first £10,000, which would have to be found 
from within schools’ existing budgets. The extent to which this represents 
a change to the current school funding system would depend on the extent 
to which local authorities currently delegate funding for pupils with 
special educational needs. The effect on individual schools will then 
depend on the variation in the average level of resources required by high-
needs pupils from year to year. If there is a lot of variation, as there may be 
for some smaller schools, schools may come under significant financial 
pressure. Unfortunately, the details of local authorities’ different funding 
formulae are not currently published and the level of support required by 
                                                      
15 C. Crawford, L. Sibieta and A. Vignoles (2011), Special Educational Needs Funding 
Systems: Role of Incentives, Policy Report 11/04, Bristol: Centre for Understanding 
Behaviour Change (http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cubec/portal/pr4.pdf). 
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different pupils at individual schools is not known either. It is thus 
relatively difficult to judge the impact of such reforms.  
Another key aspect of funding for high-needs pupils is the formula used to 
fund special schools and alternative provision (for example, Pupil Referral 
Units). Most such funding is currently provided on the basis of place-led 
rather than per-pupil funding. The most recent consultation sought views 
on the scope to move towards per-pupil funding and proposed ways to 
avoid ‘perverse incentives for local authorities to place high needs pupils 
in one type of provider rather than another’.16 
3.7 Central services 
Local authorities currently retain a proportion of their schools budget to 
spend on services that benefit all pupils in the area, and this proportion 
differs across local authorities as some delegate more responsibilities for 
providing services to schools. Under the government’s proposed school 
funding reforms, funding for a number of these services would be 
transferred to schools automatically at the local authority’s discretion. In 
particular, the government proposes the following categorisation of the 
current set of central services: 
• Central Services: services that continue to be provided by local 
authorities – for example, school admissions and servicing of Schools 
Forums; 
• High-Needs: central services relating to SEN pupils; 
• Schools: funding to be transferred to individual schools across all local 
authorities – for example, repairs of school kitchens; 
• Discretionary: funding transferred to schools at the discretion of local 
authorities and Schools Forums – for example, insurance and the costs 
of supply staff; 
• Early Years: funding for some elements of spending on early years 
provision, which would be transferred out of the schools budget.  
Other education and youth services provided centrally (for example, 
education psychology or music services) would continue to be funded 
through the Local Government Settlement.  
Figure 3.4 shows how much local authorities spent on these categories of 
services in 2010–11. In total, around 9% of the schools budget was spent 
on them on average,17 with considerable variation across local authorities. 
                                                      
16 Page 30 of Department for Education (2011), A Consultation on School Funding 
Reform: Proposals for a Fairer System. 
17 This figure is lower than that discussed in Section 2, as existing policy already implies 
that some spending previously counted as central service spending will either be 
transferred to schools or become part of the early years budget.  
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The High-Needs category is the largest, accounting for approximately 4% 
of the schools budget, on average. Services left to the discretion of local 
authorities and Schools Forums represent the second-largest element of 
local authorities’ current spending on central services (2.6% of the schools 
budget, on average).  
Figure 3.4. Level and variation in local authority spending 
 
Source: School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data, table 1, 2010–11.  
Services that will remain centrally provided represent a relatively small 
proportion of local authorities’ schools budgets, at less than 1% on 
average, and vary little across local authorities. The level of funding being 
transferred to schools is relatively modest, also representing less than 1% 
of the schools budget, on average.  
Given this amount of variation, the proposed reforms to central services 
represent a relatively modest transfer of spending from local authorities to 
schools, though it may be considerable for a small number of local 
authorities. A larger proportion of the schools budget will be transferred 
to schools only at the discretion of Schools Forums. If all such spending 
were transferred to schools, then spending by local authorities would be 
considerably lower and would mainly consist of spending on high-needs 
pupils.  
Going forwards, the government has not explicitly stated how funding for 
these central services will be distributed across local authorities once the 
reforms are implemented, merely stating that the total funding will reflect 
the total resources available and that transitional measures will take 
account of baseline levels. A number of options for distributing the central 
services block exist, such as fixed per-pupil amounts or a formula based on 
the characteristics of pupils, schools and areas (as with the Local 
Government Settlement). Alternatively, the government could roll forward 
existing spending levels. We recommend that the government explicitly 
sets out how it plans to determine the eventual funding levels for central 
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services and services transferred at discretion, under the proposed 
system. 
3.8 Academies and free schools 
The final issue is how academies and free schools should be treated in the 
new school funding system. The government seeks to fund them on an 
equivalent basis to other similar schools in the area.  
The consultation made a number of proposals for the way academies could 
be funded in the new school funding system. First, local authorities could 
calculate how much academies would receive under their own formula 
and inform the Education Funding Agency, which would then pay this 
amount to the academies. Second, the Education Funding Agency could 
replicate the formulae of local authorities based on a pro-forma 
description of their new, simpler formulae. In principle, these options will 
have the same implications for academies if no errors are made; the only 
difference is who calculates an academy’s budget. In either case, academies 
would certainly need representation on Schools Forums in order to ensure 
their views are heard.  
As stated in Section 2, free schools are currently funded on the basis of a 
separate formula that seeks to approximate local authority formulae in a 
simple and transparent fashion. In its consultation, the government 
proposed that free schools should eventually receive the same level of 
funding as implied by the new, simpler, local authority formulae in their 
area. This seems a sensible approach.  
3.9 Conclusion 
This section has considered various aspects of the design of the national 
funding formula. The first key consideration is, of course, whether one 
should have a national funding formula at all. If one feels that a national 
funding formula for schools is desirable, then the next questions are about 
what it should contain. The first set of arguments concern the basic 
amount per pupil. There are arguments both for and against harmonising 
the relative funding ratio between secondary and primary schools across 
local authorities. On the one hand, differences in funding ratios may reflect 
local authorities’ specific circumstances or their own strategic priorities 
(such as which age groups to target financial resources on). Local 
discretion may therefore be an important factor. On the other hand, 
restricting all local authorities to a similar relative funding ratio may help 
facilitate comparisons of their effectiveness, which in turn may be valuable 
to the government if it has a preference for the development of market-
style incentives. 
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Nevertheless, it is also the case that the consultation’s suggested ratio of 
1.27, if combined with its suggested lump sum for primary schools of 
£95,000, could lead to a significant redistribution of funding from 
secondary to primary schools. If this is not the intended outcome, then it 
will be necessary to adjust the basic per-pupil amounts at primary and 
secondary schools or the lump sum accordingly.  
Another key consideration is how to account for differential costs of hiring 
staff. This section has shown that the updated GLM approach, which is 
based on general wages in the local labour market, will reinforce the 
generosity of funding that Inner London and the South East currently 
enjoy relative to other parts of the country. By contrast, switching to an 
approach that also reflects the actual costs of employing teachers would 
heavily penalise such areas (and the South more generally), but would not 
penalise Outer London – which, it can be argued, has been penalised by the 
existing system. The GLM method could be justified on the basis of issues 
regarding teacher recruitment and retention in areas such as Inner 
London. However, if such issues exist, the teacher pay structure in such 
areas might also merit reconsideration, especially if one believes that head 
teachers do not possess enough freedom with regard to teacher pay.  
4. Empirical analysis 
The previous section discussed the various options available in terms of 
the development of a national funding formula. Here we seek to 
demonstrate empirically the implications of various options for a school-
level national funding formula. The assumptions we make, and why we 
make them, are clearly expressed throughout. 
The consultation on school funding reform asked for views on the contents 
of a school-level formula; the DfE is yet to publish its response to these 
views. It also asked for views on how much discretion local authorities 
should have, and indeed whether there should be a school-level formula at 
all. This uncertainty means that any attempt to model the effects of the 
proposed reforms is likely to be speculative.  
That caveat aside, the analysis will demonstrate the potential effects of 
different options for a national funding formula on the funding levels of 
individual schools (assuming local authorities do not significantly deviate 
from these allocations). We assume the reform is implemented in 2014–15 
and assess changes relative to funding in 2014–15 based on unchanged 
policy, in order to focus on the effect of a national funding formula. 
In a small number of cases, we also assess the changes relative to current 
funding levels in 2010–11. This allows us to consider the combined effect 
of the reforms and the planned changes to school funding.  
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Depending on how much discretion local authorities exercise, they could 
deviate from these school-level allocations by giving some schools more, 
but only if other schools in the local authority receive less. We thus also 
discuss the effects of the proposed reforms at the regional and local 
authority levels. This will show more clearly which areas are likely to see 
the largest changes in funding as a result of the proposed reforms, and 
thus which areas are likely to be under the most pressure. 
The government has produced a funding formula for free schools from 
September 2011. There is local variation in this formula: while it is always 
based on the same factors (number of pupils, number of FSM pupils, 
number of SEN pupils and so forth), the monetary amount attached to each 
factor varies. It is set equal to the current level of funding in that local 
authority for that factor. In other words, the free school formula reflects 
the local discretion in current fair-funding formulae. 
We consider the effects of implementing this formula for maintained 
schools in 2011–12. Doing so allows us to answer two questions: (i) Is the 
free school funding formula more or less generous than funding for 
maintained schools? (ii) What would be the effect of the proposed reforms 
if current patterns of local discretion with regard to funding factors were 
retained? Both are crucial questions for policymakers.  
Any such reforms will need to be phased in over time. Thus, in Section 5, 
we discuss issues relating to transition to a new formula.  
4.1 Methodology for school-level analysis 
We analyse the reforms as if they were in place in 2014–15. This is a 
pragmatic assumption, not a judgement about whether they should be 
implemented in 2013–14 or 2014–15. We then calculate schools’ expected 
2014–15 funding levels under existing policy, i.e. if no formula is 
implemented. This is the same calculation as the one made in Section 2. In 
particular, we assume a pupil premium worth £1,900 per pupil eligible for 
FSM, on top of a cash-terms freeze in existing spending per pupil. We also 
assume that primary and secondary pupil numbers grow in line with 
national projections (with differential growth by FSM eligibility status in 
2011–12, as per the January 2011 School Census). This leads to 9.4% 
growth in cash-terms funding per pupil. It is slightly less than current 
spending plans imply, largely because we are not able to allocate to 
schools the pupil premiums for service children and children in care. 
We then calculate school funding levels under alternative policy options. 
To do so, we start with the pupil characteristics and numbers projected 
forwards above. We also keep the same envelope for revenue funding, 
allowing for a 9.4% cash-terms increase in funding per pupil. This would 
equate to a real-terms cut of 1.6% per pupil based on the GDP deflator.  
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Throughout this analysis, we hold constant a number of factors, which we 
assume would take the same value in any new school funding system.18 In 
particular, we hold constant pupil-led funding for SEN,19 any budgetary 
adjustments made in 2010–11 and any funding received via the Early 
Years Single Funding Formula (as primary schools receive some funding to 
deliver free nursery places for 3- and 4-year-olds). We exclude funding 
from the Learning and Skills Council for sixth forms and sixth-form pupils, 
as the proposed reforms focus on under-16 schooling.  
4.2 School-level analysis 
We begin by considering five simple options for a national funding 
formula. In these options, we only vary the basic amounts provided for all 
pupils, the level of the pupil premium and the level of the lump-sum 
amount. We leave the adjustment for differential labour costs (the Area 
Cost Adjustment or ACA) unchanged to focus solely on the effects of the 
above factors. Table 4.1 summarises the details of these five options, as 
well as their implications for individual school funding levels, relative to 
what would otherwise be expected in 2014–15. It also shows the same 
details and implications for two options that do vary the level of the ACA, 
which will be discussed later in this section and in Section 4.3.  
For each option, Table 4.1 shows: 
• the assumptions made regarding basic amounts, fixed costs and the 
pupil premium; 
• the percentages of primary and secondary schools that see an increase 
in funding; 
• the average change in funding levels for both primary and secondary 
schools; 
• the average change among the 10% most deprived and 10% least 
deprived schools (both primary and secondary); 
• the percentages of primary and secondary schools seeing ‘large’ gains 
or losses as a result of the potential reform (‘large’ being defined as 
10% or more).  
                                                      
18 We exclude some schools from the analysis: special schools, those that have only 
opened very recently, and free schools and academies with no predecessor school (as 
no pupil data are available). In the case of converter academies, we exclude the LACSEG 
from our calculations to ensure consistency with maintained schools. 
19 Ideally, we would only hold constant funding for Individually Assigned Resources, but 
this is not available in publicly-available data. We would also like to model the effects 
of the proposed reforms to high-needs funding; this would only be possible if we knew 
the precise details of local authorities’ current formulae and the level of resources 
assigned to individual pupils. 
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In the first option (referred to as ‘Primary Lump Sum’), we consider the 
following specific formula: 
• A ratio of 1.27 for basic per-pupil funding in secondary schools relative 
to primary schools. This is the centre of the proposed allowable range 
for local authorities and is based on current average funding levels. 
• A £95,000 lump sum for primary schools. 
• A pupil premium for each pupil eligible for FSM. It is 25% greater for 
pupils at secondary schools than for pupils at primary schools. The 
levels have been set so that the formula is at least as progressive as the 
proposed pupil premium under current funding policy. This 
assumption allows us to isolate the impact of a national funding 
formula in itself, rather than conflating it with the introduction of the 
pupil premium. However, this neutrality cannot be achieved exactly; 
indeed, in this first option, the formula would be less progressive. This 
will not be the case in other options.  
• As stated, we leave the ACA unchanged in order to focus solely on the 
effects of the above factors. 
• As in all other options, the total level of school funding is set equal to 
the total expected in 2014–15 under existing policy.  
Under this first option, there would be substantial redistribution from 
secondary to primary schools: primary schools would, on average, 
experience gains of 4.7% in funding, while secondary schools would see an 
average loss of 5.9%. Nearly 40% of secondary schools, and less than 10% 
of primary schools, would see losses of 10% or more. This option is clearly 
far more generous to primary schools than the present system. The 
consultation did not articulate a desire to implement redistribution from 
secondary to primary schools of this magnitude; we therefore go on to 
consider formula options that are more generous to secondary schools.  
In the second option (‘Both Lump Sum’), we add a lump sum of £300,000 
for secondary schools. This reduces the per-pupil amounts that can be 
provided; even with this high lump sum, there is still redistribution from 
secondary to primary schools. The pupil premium is set at similar levels to 
those in the first option.  
In the third option (‘Low Disruption’), we remove the lump sum for 
secondary schools and instead increase the ratio between the basic 
amounts for secondary and primary pupils to 1.45. This reduces the basic 
amount for primary schools and increases it for secondary schools. Under 
this option, the redistribution from secondary to primary schools is much 
more modest, with primary schools only gaining 0.7%, on average, and 
secondary schools only losing 0.4%, on average. This option also roughly 
maintains the level of progressivity currently expected in 2014–15, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the average change amongst the most 
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deprived primary schools is similar to the average change amongst the 
least deprived ones, with this pattern also holding for secondary schools.  
However, 15% of primary schools would still see falls in funding of 10% or 
more, as would about one-sixth (16%) of secondary schools. Smaller 
proportions would see large gains (about 10% in each case). However, the 
proportion of schools seeing either large losses or large gains is far smaller 
than under the first two options, which is why we refer to this option as 
‘Low Disruption’. 
From this analysis, it is clear that implementing a ratio of 1.27 for basic 
per-pupil funding at secondary schools relative to primary schools leads to 
significant redistribution from secondary to primary schools, if combined 
with the consultation’s proposed £95,000 lump sum for primary schools. 
The consultation did not explicitly make the case for redistribution from 
secondary to primary schools and it thus seems likely that the government 
would want to adjust basic per-pupil funding ratios to prevent this. Such 
redistribution can be limited by using a higher secondary to primary 
funding ratio, such as the 1.45 employed here.  
We now consider potential reforms to the pupil premium. In the next 
option (‘Constant FSM’), we take the ‘Low Disruption’ option but 
implement the same pupil premium for primary and secondary schools 
(set at £4,860 per pupil eligible for FSM). This creates significant 
redistribution from deprived secondary schools to deprived primary 
schools: the former see cuts of nearly 6% while the latter experience gains 
of just under 4%. To avoid this, the pupil premium will clearly need to be 
higher at secondary schools.  
The government is also currently considering an extension of the pupil 
premium to those who have ever been eligible for FSM (in the last three or 
six years). Our fifth option (‘Ever FSM’) examines this quantitatively. It 
takes the ‘Low Disruption’ option but allocates a pupil premium for all 
pupils who have been eligible for FSM at any point in the last three years, 
rather than only in the current year. The first thing to notice is that the 
pupil premium is necessarily smaller – by about £800 – as it must cover 
more pupils. Second, the most deprived primary schools would be relative 
losers compared with the ‘Low Disruption’ option. It is important to 
qualify this, however, as it depends on how schools are ranked into deciles 
of deprivation. We have ranked schools by the proportion of pupils 
currently eligible for FSM; a pupil premium allocated on the same measure 
will, by construction, appear more progressive than a pupil premium 
distributed in other ways.  
The main reason why deprived primary schools are the biggest losers from 
the ‘Ever FSM’ option compared with the ‘Low Disruption’ option is the 
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effect of time: it is easier to record previous FSM eligibility for pupils who 
have been in the school system longer, i.e. for older pupils. In Reception or 
Year 1, one can only record whether children were eligible for FSM in one 
or two years including the current one, because they had not started 
school one or two years ago, respectively. For pupils currently in Year 2 
onwards, information exists for all three years. While current FSM 
eligibility for primary and secondary pupils is 18.0% and 14.6% 
respectively, eligibility at any point over the last three years is 21.0% and 
18.9% respectively. The increase is smaller for primary schools, so 
deprived primary schools lose more than deprived secondary schools do 
(relative to the ‘Low Disruption’ option).  
Figure 4.1 shows how the expected change in funding per pupil under 
existing policy varies by school deprivation, and compares this with what 
would be expected under the ‘Low Disruption’ and ‘Ever FSM’ options. 
Specifically, it splits primary schools (panel a) and secondary schools 
(panel b) into deciles according to the proportion of children eligible for 
FSM in January 2010. The first decile contains the 10% of schools with the 
highest levels of current FSM eligibility, while the tenth decile contains the 
schools with the lowest levels of current FSM eligibility. The dark grey bars 
show the average levels of funding per pupil amongst schools in each 
decile in 2010–11. The fact that the tops of these bars slope downwards 
indicates that the current system is already quite ‘progressive’. The light 
grey bars show the expected level of funding per pupil in 2014–15 under 
existing policy. The fact that the slope in these bars is steeper than the 
current pattern indicates that the pupil premium is expected to increase 
the level of progressivity. The solid black line shows the average 
percentage change in cash-terms funding per pupil for each decile, 
between 2010–11 and 2014–15 under existing policy. The most deprived 
primary and secondary schools are expected to see the highest increases 
in funding: 20% and 13% respectively. As a reminder, cumulative 
economy-wide inflation is expected to be 11.2% over this period, while 
cumulative schools-specific inflation is expected to be 8.4%. 
The dashed black line in Figure 4.1 shows the cash-terms change in 
funding per pupil over the same period if the ‘Low Disruption’ option is in 
place in 2014–15. The fact that this pattern is very similar to what we 
currently expect under existing policy arises by design and reflects our 
assumption that the national funding formula will maintain the expected 
level of progressivity in 2014–15. 
The black dotted line shows the expected cash-terms change in funding 
per pupil under the ‘Ever FSM’ option. It makes clear that this option 
would be less progressive than both the ‘Low Disruption’ option and the 
system in 2014–15 under existing policy. Furthermore, the reduction in 
progressivity would be largest for primary schools.  
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Figure 4.1. Change in school funding by decile of school deprivation between  
2010–11 and 2014–15 under various options 
a) Primary schools 
 
b) Secondary schools 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics 
are taken from LEASIS (Local Education Authority and School Information Service) and National Pupil Database. 
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It should be remembered that all this analysis assumes that local 
authorities do not deviate from the school-level formula. The actual effects 
of the national formula could be different if local authorities did indeed 
deviate from it. However, tight restrictions on the permissible ratio 
between secondary and primary funding would make some redistribution 
from secondary to primary schools inevitable. 
The above analysis also maintains the ACA uplifts at their current levels. 
As indicated in Section 3, a new or updated version may be desirable, 
given that the current one was set in the early 2000s. In the next two 
options, we repeat the ‘Low Disruption’ option with the two proposed 
ACAs in the consultation (the updated GLM approach and the combined 
approach). As is shown in Table 4.1, both are very similar to the ‘Low 
Disruption’ option in terms of the average gains and losses amongst 
primary and secondary schools.  
Figure 4.2. Changes in school funding levels under ‘Low Disruption’ option with 
current or combined ACA factors, relative to 2014–15 levels under existing policy 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics 
are taken from LEASIS (Local Education Authority and School Information Service) and National Pupil Database. 
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current ACA; the dashed lines do the same for the ‘Low Disruption’ option 
with the combined ACA. Amongst both primary and secondary schools, the 
two options imply remarkably similar changes. As we have already seen, 
about one-sixth of primary and secondary schools would experience losses 
of 10% or more under these policy options. We can now also see that 
about a third of secondary schools would see losses of 5% or more, as 
would just under 30% of primary schools. On the other hand, about a 
quarter of secondary schools would see gains of 5% or more under either 
option, as would about 30% of primary schools.  
The fact that these options give a very similar overall picture is not 
particularly surprising. The key differences will arise when the 
implications at the local authority and regional levels are analysed in 
Section 4.3.  
As we made clear earlier, existing funding policy up to 2014–15 already 
implies significant changes in funding across schools relative to 2010–11, 
as a result of the cash-terms freeze in existing spending per pupil and the 
creation of the pupil premium. A crucial question for schools is how the 
proposed reforms could interact with the changes to funding that have 
already been planned.  
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the changes in school funding levels 
implied by the ‘Low Disruption’ option with the combined ACA, compared 
with funding in 2010–11, for (a) primary schools and (b) secondary 
schools. The net changes shown by the dashed lines combine the effect of 
this option with the planned changes in school funding up to 2014–15 
under existing policy (solid lines). For reference, the graphs also show the 
levels of cumulative economy-wide inflation (solid vertical grey line) and 
schools-specific cost inflation (dashed vertical grey line). 
The ‘Low Disruption’ option with the combined ACA leads to two 
differences from the planned policy changes. First, fewer schools would see 
real-terms cuts in funding (under either measure of inflation) compared 
with existing policy. However, more schools would see larger cuts in 
funding. In fact, over 20% of primary schools and around 30% of 
secondary schools would experience cash-terms reductions in funding; 
under current policy, no schools would experience these. 
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Figure 4.3. Cash-terms changes in school funding between 2010–11 and 2014–15 
under existing policy, and under ‘Low Disruption’ option with combined ACA  
a) Primary schools 
 
b) Secondary schools 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics 
are taken from LEASIS (Local Education Authority and School Information Service) and National Pupil Database. 
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4.3 Regional analysis 
The previous section considered the impacts of moving to a national 
funding formula that minimised the amount of disruption to school 
funding levels (among all the options considered). However, even if 
changes at the school level are minimised, there could still be significant 
consequences at the local or regional level. First, local authorities currently 
fund similar schools in different ways, and at least some of this discretion 
will be curtailed under a national funding formula. Second, the proposed 
reforms to the ACA methodology would have significant and different 
consequences for the regional pattern of school funding levels, as 
demonstrated in Section 3.5. 
The analysis in this section therefore considers the effect of these policy 
options at the regional and local authority levels. Figure 4.4 shows the 
average impact at regional level of moving to the ‘Low Disruption’ option 
under the current ACA methodology, under the new combined approach 
and under the updated GLM approach. This is shown separately for 
primary schools (panel a) and secondary schools (panel b). In each case, 
the impacts are relative to what the funding levels would have been in 
2014–15 under existing policy with the existing ACA factors. 
Both primary and secondary schools in the North East, West Midlands and 
Yorkshire & the Humber would lose funding, on average, as a result of 
these reforms. These losses would be slightly lower under the combined 
ACA but slightly higher under the updated GLM ACA. In the East Midlands 
and the South East, both types of school would see increases in funding, on 
average, under the reforms. For the South East, these increases would be 
smaller under the combined ACA, but of similar sizes under the current 
and updated GLM ACAs. 
Primary schools in the East of England and in the South West would 
experience increases in funding under all the ACA versions, but secondary 
schools would see little change. Secondary schools in the North West 
would lose funding, on average, whereas primary schools there would see 
little change.  
Schools in Outer London would see little change, on average, under the 
current ACA, though they would see a slight increase in funding under the 
combined ACA or updated GLM. The pattern for Inner London is different 
and more dependent on the ACA methodology. Primary schools would see 
a fall in funding as a result of moving to the ‘Low Disruption’ option with 
the current ACA. This fall would be increased under the combined ACA 
approach but lessened under the updated GLM approach. Secondary 
schools, on the other hand, would see increases in funding, and such 
increases would be noticeably higher under the updated GLM approach.  
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Figure 4.4. Region-level change in school funding in 2014–15 under ‘Low 
Disruption’ option with different ACA factors, compared with expected funding in 
2014–15 under existing policy 
a) Primary schools 
 
b) Secondary schools 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics 
are taken from LEASIS (Local Education Authority and School Information Service) and National Pupil Database. 
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appropriate system of school funding, then these results would imply that 
schools in these regions are currently over-funded on average. In other 
regions (East Midlands and South East), schools would see an increase in 
funding; these might be deemed to have been under-funded under current 
policy if a national funding formula is preferred. For other regions outside 
of London, the picture differs between primary and secondary schools. 
Outer London would see very small changes on average. 
In most cases, changing the ACA methodology has little impact on the 
magnitude or direction of the effect. The impact of changing the ACA 
methodology is largest for London and the South East. Any change in the 
ACA would benefit schools in Outer London. Schools in Inner London 
would see increases in funding under the updated GLM ACA, while schools 
in the South East would lose funding as a result of moving to the combined 
approach for the ACA.  
Nevertheless, in all cases, the changes by region are small: less than 5%, on 
average. We now turn to average changes by local authority, as the size of 
these effects seems likely to drive most of the regional patterns we 
observe. This is naturally an even more speculative exercise than the 
analysis presented up to now. However, such analysis can still be 
informative about the extent to which changes in funding are likely to be 
concentrated in particular local authorities and which local authorities are 
likely to receive the largest changes.  
Figure 4.5 plots the average changes in funding under the ‘Low Disruption’ 
option with the combined ACA amongst primary schools (panel a) and 
secondary schools (panel b) in different local authorities. In each case, the 
changes are ordered from highest to lowest. Again, the changes are 
presented relative to the expected funding levels in 2014–15 under 
existing policy. Appendix Table A.5 shows the underlying data for these 
graphs, along with the expected average changes under the current and 
updated GLM ACAs. 
The first point to notice is that the spread of changes at local authority 
level is much wider than the spread by region, and there are a small 
number of local authorities where large gains or losses are felt. This 
pattern is likely to be driven by a number of factors. First, some local 
authorities will currently have higher or lower levels of funding for both 
primary and secondary schools than those implied by a single national 
funding formula. If one believes that the latter represent an appropriate 
system of school funding, then these local authorities could be described 
as over- or under-funded at present. Alternatively, one might believe that 
the current system reflects local knowledge and is preferable. In this case, 
if some local authorities lose or gain funding, the interpretation would be 
that the school factors upon which the formula is based (such as the 
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number of pupils eligible for FSM) do not capture the true educational 
needs of the schools in those areas.  
Figure 4.5. Local-authority-level change in school funding in 2014–15 under ‘Low 
Disruption’ option with combined ACA, compared with expected funding in 2014–
15 under existing policy 
a) Primary schools 
 
b) Secondary schools 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics 
are taken from LEASIS (Local Education Authority and School Information Service) and National Pupil Database. 
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Although this is not obvious from Figure 4.5, there is actually only a weak 
association between the change in funding for a local authority’s primary 
schools and the change in funding for its secondary schools.20 This points 
to another important driving force behind the patterns that are observed. 
A national funding formula would harmonise the secondary to primary 
school funding ratio across local authorities. Hence secondary schools in 
local authorities with a higher-than-average ratio of secondary to primary 
funding would lose, on average, while primary schools in such local 
authorities would experience an increase in funding, on average. This 
pattern would be reversed in local authorities where the secondary to 
primary funding ratio is below the national average.  
Another potential explanation for changes by local authority is the fact that 
some local authorities choose to retain different amounts to spend on 
central services. Our analysis does not take such differences into account. 
However, as our analysis in Section 3.7 showed, a large proportion of these 
differences relate to spending on high-needs pupils; pupil-led funding for 
pupils with SEN is held constant in our analysis.  
As already stated, the exact changes by local authority under the ‘Low 
Disruption’ option are shown in Appendix Table A.5. The most important 
point to notice is that the average changes are largely constant across the 
three different ACA methodologies. The exceptions to this are to be 
expected from the previous regional analysis. Schools in Inner London 
would benefit more from the updated GLM methodology (though Haringey 
and Newham would actually benefit more from the combined approach). 
Schools in Outer London would, by and large, benefit from any change to 
the ACA. Schools in the South East would generally lose from moving to the 
combined ACA approach, particularly in areas just outside London (for 
example, Reading, Surrey and West Berkshire). 
Looking at Table A.5, we observe that under all three scenarios, the largest 
increases in funding for primary schools are in Bromley and South 
Gloucestershire (over 10% in all cases). The largest falls in primary school 
funding are in Bradford, the Isle of Wight, Luton, Newham and Southwark 
(over 10% in almost all cases). Amongst secondary schools, the largest 
increases are in Buckinghamshire, Merton and Sutton (over 10% in almost 
all cases), whilst the largest falls are in Liverpool, Rotherham and 
Wolverhampton (over 10% in all cases). Which local authorities see the 
most extreme changes in funding therefore depends on whether primary 
or secondary schools are considered. Hence harmonising the ratio of 
                                                      
20 The correlation coefficient between funding changes for primary and secondary 
schools ranges from 0.45 to 0.58 depending on the ACA regime. 
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secondary to primary school funding drives some of the average changes 
observed across local authorities.  
However, there are also some local authorities that see consistently large 
increases amongst both primary and secondary schools, and some that see 
consistently large falls. Primary and secondary schools in Coventry, 
Liverpool, North East Lincolnshire, Wigan and Wolverhampton would see 
average falls of 6% or more under all three ACA methods, while primary 
and secondary schools in Derbyshire, Islington and Warwickshire would 
see average increases of 6% or more. If one believes that a single national 
funding formula represents an appropriate system of school funding, such 
local authorities would be deemed to be currently over- or under-funded 
respectively. Alternatively, one might believe that these local authorities 
have higher or lower levels of educational need than those implied by the 
factors upon which a national formula might be based.  
4.4 Free school formula 
The government has also published the proposed funding formula for free 
schools in 2011–12. This is based on a small set of locally-varying factors 
and aims to mimic the current average local authority funding of 
maintained schools in order to ensure that free schools are funded on the 
same basis as similar maintained schools in the same area. First, the 
formula allocates a lump sum of £95,000 for all primary schools (as the 
most recent consultation proposed). Second, based on funding levels in 
2010–11, it calculates a level of basic funding per pupil and a level of 
funding targeted at pupils eligible for FSM (excluding the costs of the lump 
sum). These levels differ across local authorities. In addition, free schools 
will also receive the national pupil premium amounts, including £488 for 
pupils eligible for free school meals. Lastly, in a similar vein to academies, 
free schools will also receive additional funding to reflect the fact that they 
are responsible for services that would be provided for maintained schools 
by local authorities.  
Since free schools are new establishments, it is not possible to measure the 
effect of the funding formula relative to funding in previous years. Instead, 
to illustrate its effect, we apply it to all current schools and compare the 
funding levels that result with the funding levels that schools would have 
had in 2011–12 under current policy.21 This process demonstrates the 
overall generosity of the free school formula relative to current funding 
                                                      
21 This exercise cannot be conducted for other years because the formula is only 
available for 2011–12. 
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arrangements.22 Since the factors in the formula vary by local authority, 
the formula can also be interpreted as a sign of what a future national 
funding formula might look like if all local authorities were to exercise as 
much discretion as possible. 
Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of changes in funding levels that would 
arise if all schools were funded according to the free school formula for 
2011–12, relative to current funding levels for 2011–12. The black line 
illustrates the distribution for primary schools, while the grey one 
corresponds to secondary schools. The formula is, on balance, slightly 
more generous to primary schools than secondary schools: over 60% of 
primary schools would see an increase in funding as a free school, 
compared with only half of secondary schools. A quarter of secondary 
schools would experience a significant loss of funding (at least 5%), 
compared with about one-sixth of primary schools. At the other end of the 
scale, one in ten primary and secondary schools would see large increases 
in funding, of 10% or more.  
Figure 4.6. Changes in school funding under free school formula, relative to  
2011–12 funding levels under existing policy 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics 
are taken from LEASIS (Local Education Authority and School Information Service) and National Pupil Database. 
                                                      
22 At this stage, it is important to note that we include the LACSEG and SEN elements 
within the baseline for maintained schools. As such, current funding should be 
interpreted as current funding plus LACSEG and SEN elements per pupil.  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
-25% -20% -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
sc
ho
o
ls
Percentage change in funding per pupil
Primary Secondary
 
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2011 
51
Figure 4.7. Change in school funding under free school formula, relative to  
2011–12 funding levels under existing policy, by decile of school deprivation 
a) Primary schools 
 
b) Secondary schools 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics 
are taken from LEASIS (Local Education Authority and School Information Service) and National Pupil Database. 
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In the round, the free school formula is slightly more generous than 
current funding arrangements. The hypothetical extra cost is small in the 
sense that the difference between the current funding of maintained 
schools and what they might receive as a free school is only around 1%, on 
average. However, this is actually an underestimate, since free schools 
would also receive SEN funding in the form of Individually Assigned 
Resources, which is on top of the formula funding (as it is attached to 
particular pupils). 
To assess the relative progressivity of the proposed free school formula, 
we return to the decile charts of school funding. In Figure 4.7, the dark 
grey bars show the current levels of school funding in 2011–12 by 
deprivation decile, for (a) primary schools and (b) secondary schools. The 
light grey bars show what funding levels by decile would look like if all 
such schools were subject to the free school formula. The black line then 
plots, on the right-hand axis, the relative change in funding levels for each 
decile.  
Generally, the differences between actual funding and funding under the 
free school formula are very small for each decile. Primary schools appear 
to be on average better off across all deciles, but those that are less 
deprived seem to benefit by slightly more than those that are more 
deprived. Meanwhile, many deprived secondary schools (those in deciles 2 
and 3) would be made slightly worse off by the free school formula, while 
more affluent secondary schools would be slightly better off. Hence the 
free school formula appears to be slightly less progressive than current 
funding allocations. 
Overall, therefore, if the free school formula were applied universally, it 
would lead to a slightly more expensive and slightly less progressive 
funding system than that which is planned under existing arrangements. 
However, the differences are relatively small.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This section has quantified the implications of moving to a national 
funding formula in a manner that is revenue-neutral and which does not 
affect the degree of progressivity in the distribution of school funding after 
the pupil premium has been implemented.  
The first key message from this analysis is that the specific monetary 
amounts involved in a formula must be chosen extremely carefully, if 
significant disruption to school finances (or redistribution between 
different types of school) is not a desired outcome of the reform. In 
particular, we have demonstrated that any formula that combines a ratio 
of secondary to primary funding of 1.27 with a £95,000 lump sum for 
primary schools leads, on balance, to gains among primary schools but 
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losses among secondary schools. To alleviate this, the funding ratio should 
be more heavily geared towards secondary school pupils. In our analysis, 
we find that a ratio of 1.45 minimises the redistribution from secondary to 
primary schools.  
It is important to recognise as well that current levels of deprivation 
funding are also geared more strongly towards secondary schools. A 
formula that aimed to minimise disruption would thus need to implement 
a higher pupil premium for secondary schools than for primary schools. In 
total, we calculate that a pupil premium would need to be about £4,400 
per primary pupil and £5,400 per secondary pupil in order to maintain the 
planned degree of progressivity in the school funding system.  
We have also examined the potential effects of implementing a pupil 
premium for those who have ever been eligible for free school meals in the 
last three years. This would cover more pupils than a pupil premium based 
only on current FSM eligibility, making the overall value of the pupil 
premium smaller. Hence the system would become less progressive 
(particularly for primary schools).  
Even with careful design to minimise disruption, it is inevitable that there 
will be large numbers of winners and losers. About one-sixth of primary 
and secondary schools would see losses of 10% or more, while around one 
in ten would see gains of 10% or more. Such changes would be the result 
of greater harmonisation across local authorities. Combining the effects of 
moving to a national formula with the existing plans for school funding, we 
find that around 7% of schools would see cash-terms reductions in funding 
of at least 10% between 2010–11 and 2014–15. This is clearly a worse 
outcome for those schools than the alternative (under existing policy) of at 
worst a cash-terms freeze. However, it is important to reiterate that 
current policy would lead to funding per pupil becoming less transparent 
over time, continuing the trend since 2006.  
Combining the ‘Low Disruption’ reform with changes to the ACA 
methodology also has significant implications at a regional level. On 
average, the South East and the East Midlands would benefit overall, while 
the North East, West Midlands and Yorkshire & the Humber would lose 
out.  
Changes in funding will be concentrated in particular areas, with average 
gains and losses being more than 10% in some local authorities. In some 
cases, the changes amongst primary and secondary schools are offsetting, 
simply reflecting greater harmonisation across local authorities in the 
ratio of secondary to primary school funding. In other cases, both primary 
and secondary schools are expected to see large changes in funding. If one 
believes that a single national funding formula represents an appropriate 
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system of school funding, then such local authorities would be deemed to 
be currently over- or under-funded. Alternatively, one might believe that 
these local authorities have higher or lower levels of educational need than 
those implied by the factors upon which a national formula might be 
based.  
Whatever formula is chosen, it will lead to a large number of winners and 
losers relative to existing policy, unless local authorities have complete 
discretion to set schools’ allocations. This situation is an inevitable 
consequence of replacing the current system, where funding levels can be 
based on myriad historical and local factors, by a streamlined version 
where funding is more transparent and consistent across the country. 
5. Transitional arrangements 
The previous section demonstrated the eventual impact (as if it had 
occurred in 2014–15) of moving to a national funding formula, for a 
version of the formula that implies the least disruption among all the 
options considered (‘Low Disruption’). Even so, some schools would 
experience significant turbulence in their funding levels under this option: 
Figure 4.3 demonstrated that a considerable proportion of schools would 
see cash-terms reductions in their funding per pupil. 
What Section 4 did not discuss is how long it might take to implement such 
a formula in order to make the transition to the new funding levels as 
smooth as possible, and the effects in the intervening years. We now 
explore these issues. 
5.1 The costs of transition 
The main way to smooth the transition from the current system to a 
national funding formula would be to impose a floor on the annual change 
in funding per pupil that a school might experience. For example, a floor of 
–5% would mean that no school could experience a reduction in funding 
per pupil of more than 5%. Imposing a floor clearly increases the time 
required for all schools to arrive at the allocations determined by the 
national funding formula, but it provides a more stable and consistent path 
towards the eventual allocation. The recent consultation considered a 
cash-terms floor (using the Minimum Funding Guarantee) of –1.5% per 
year.  
We have addressed this issue by calculating, for a range of potential cash-
terms floors from –1% to –10%, how long it would take for all schools to 
reach the allocations given by the ‘Low Disruption’ option with the 
combined ACA. This analysis is presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Possible durations and costs of transition under ‘Low Disruption’ option 
with combined ACA 
Floor on annual 
cash-terms loss 
in funding per 
pupil 
Length of 
transition 
(years) 
Cumulative total cost of transition 
(£m, cash terms) 
Without ceiling on 
increases in funding 
With ceiling of 
10% per year 
–1% 30 5,896 3,204 
–2% 15 2,699 1,216 
–3% 10 1,641 561 
–4% 8 1,124 462 
–5% 6 811 377 
–6% 5 609 303 
–7% 5 474 240 
–8% 4 370 187 
–9% 4 296 142 
–10% 3 235 104 
Sources: Authors’ calculations. School financial data are based on Section 251 Budget Data. School-level characteristics 
are taken from LEASIS (Local Education Authority and School Information Service) and National Pupil Database. 
The first column contains the potential value of the floor. The second 
column features the number of years that would be required for all schools 
to reach their formula allocations, given the floor that has been 
implemented. Naturally, the smaller the floor (that is, the closer it is to 
zero), the more losses are deferred to future years. Thus, with a smaller 
floor, it takes longer for schools to complete the adjustment process. With 
an annual cash-terms floor of –1% per year, it would take 30 years to 
reach the formula allocations (i.e. by 2044 if starting in 2014), whereas it 
would only take three years with a floor of –10% per year. In between 
these, it would take six years to reach the new formula if schools were 
allowed to lose up to 5% of their cash-terms funding per pupil annually. If 
such a transition were to begin in 2014–15, then 99% of schools would be 
on the new formula by 2020.  
The third column of Table 5.1 shows the cumulative additional spending 
required while maintaining a given floor over the years that it is needed. 
For instance, imposing a cash-terms floor of –5% per year would cost a 
cumulative total of about £810 million over six years (or £135 million a 
year) in cash terms. The additional spending is required to limit the cuts in 
individual schools’ budgets to 5%, instead of the larger cuts that the 
formula might imply. It is clear by now that the floor of –1.5% suggested 
by the consultation would be very expensive and would require a very 
lengthy adjustment process. Indeed, cash-terms floors of –3% or smaller 
would require at least £1.6 billion in additional funding and a transitional 
period of at least a decade. 
In order to make these floors less expensive, the government could also 
implement a ceiling on annual increases in per-pupil funding and use the 
savings to cross-subsidise the floor. This might also be appealing if one 
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believes that large sudden increases in funding would not be spent 
efficiently by schools. Imposing a ceiling would have the effect of staging 
any large gains over time. The final column of Table 5.1 illustrates the net 
cost of imposing each floor when a ceiling of 10% on annual cash-terms 
increases in funding per pupil is also imposed. This significantly reduces 
the cumulative total additional spending required. For example, if one 
chose to implement a floor of –5% alongside a ceiling of 10% per year, the 
cumulative cost would fall from £810 million to £380 million in cash 
terms. The annual additional cost would fall to £60 million a year. 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that such transitional 
mechanisms would not stop individual schools from losing large amounts; 
the losses would simply be drawn out over a number of years. 
Furthermore, repeated cash-terms cuts in per-pupil funding of 5% per 
year would still present a significant challenge for some schools.  
5.2 Conclusion 
Given the amount of turbulence that a national funding formula could 
create for school finances, it is important to consider the potential for 
smoothing the transition to the formula. Taking the ‘Low Disruption’ 
option with the combined ACA methodology, we find that it is possible to 
complete the transition within six years (i.e. by 2020) at an additional cost 
of £380 million (£60 million a year). 
However, this would not be painless for schools: some of them may incur 
repeated annual cash-terms funding losses of up to 5%, and it remains to 
be seen whether sustained reductions of this magnitude are politically 
feasible. Given that a national funding formula creates winners and losers, 
the current environment (characterised by falling real-terms budgets) is 
sure to compound the challenges of implementing such a reform. 
On the other hand, the risks of moving to a national funding formula 
should be weighed against the ‘pain of the status quo’: the complexities in 
the current system mean that schools’ funding levels are not transparently 
related to their circumstances and are not responsive to immediate 
changes in needs. The crucial question for the government is whether the 
advantages of a national formula, such as greater simplicity, transparency 
and responsiveness of funding, are worth more than the costs that the 
adjustment process would entail. 
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6. Conclusions 
This Briefing Note has described in detail the mechanics and key features 
of the current school funding system. It has also considered the main 
design issues for moving to a national funding formula. Finally, it has 
demonstrated empirically the implications of implementing such a reform 
for school finances and pointed out the inevitable challenges involved. 
While the level of funding that schools receive has increased in recent 
years, it exhibits very wide variation. To a large extent, this is because 
schools differ in their characteristics: those with a larger proportion of 
disadvantaged or high-needs pupils tend to be funded more generously. 
However, there is still some variation in funding levels across schools with 
very similar characteristics. School finances also depend on historical 
factors, such as the funding received in previous years, meaning that their 
funding adjusts slowly to changes in need. An explicit, transparent formula 
would depart from this, ensuring that funding levels respond immediately 
to changes in need. 
The first key message from the empirical analysis of the implications of a 
national funding formula is that the specific monetary amounts involved 
must be chosen extremely carefully. Any formula that combines a ratio of 
secondary to primary funding of 1.27 with a £95,000 lump sum for 
primary schools (our interpretation of the government’s proposals in the 
consultation) leads, on balance, to gains among primary schools but losses 
among secondary schools. To alleviate this, the funding ratio should be 
more heavily geared towards secondary school pupils. In our analysis, we 
use a funding ratio of 1.45, which appears to minimise the redistribution 
from secondary to primary schools. 
It is important to recognise as well that current levels of deprivation 
funding are also geared more strongly towards secondary schools. A 
formula that aimed to minimise disruption would need to implement a 
higher pupil premium at secondary schools than at primary schools. In 
total, we calculate that a pupil premium would need to be worth about 
£4,400 at primary schools and £5,400 at secondary schools in order to 
maintain the current levels of progressivity in the school funding system 
after the pupil premium is fully implemented.  
Changes in funding will be concentrated in particular local authorities, 
with average gains and losses being more than 10% in some local 
authorities. In some cases, the changes amongst primary and secondary 
schools are offsetting, simply reflecting greater harmonisation across local 
authorities in the ratio of secondary to primary school funding. In other 
cases, both primary and secondary schools are expected to see large 
changes in funding. If one believes that a single national funding formula 
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represents an appropriate system of school funding, then such local 
authorities would be deemed to be currently over- or under-funded. 
Alternatively, one might believe that some local authorities have higher or 
lower levels of educational need than those implied by the factors upon 
which a national formula might be based. 
However, whatever formula is chosen, it will lead to a large number of 
winners and losers relative to existing policy, unless local authorities have 
complete discretion to set schools’ allocations. This is an inevitable 
consequence of replacing the current system, where funding levels can be 
based on myriad historical and local factors, by a streamlined version 
where funding is more transparent and consistent across the country. 
Given this, we consider the potential for staging the process of transition 
to a national funding formula. For the example formula used in this 
Briefing Note, it is possible to complete the transition at a relatively small 
additional cost to the government. However, the transition period could be 
long and entail significant, sustained annual losses for many schools – for 
example, losses of more than 5% per year. A key question that remains is 
whether sustained reductions of this magnitude are politically feasible. 
Given that a national funding formula will create winners and losers, the 
current environment, characterised by falling real-terms budgets, is sure 
to compound the challenges of implementing such a reform. Ultimately, 
the likely future pain of this reform must be weighed against the pain of 
the status quo, with the system becoming less transparent and less related 
to educational need over time. The crucial question for the government is 
whether the advantages of a national formula, such as greater simplicity, 
transparency and responsiveness of funding, are worth more than the 
costs that the adjustment process would entail. However, the fact that 
there will be winners and losers is not an argument in itself against 
reform. If one believes that a national funding formula represents the most 
desirable school funding system, then the numbers of winners and losers 
just show how far we are from this system. If one considers a national 
funding formula to be right in principle, then failing to implement 
substantial reform to school funding would lead to a further drift away 
from the desirable system and a greater cost of implementing reform 
towards it in future. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1. Total funding for primary schools, 2010–11 (2010–11 prices) 
 Fair-funding 
formula 
All funding 
Base per-pupil amount 2,292*** 2,423*** 
Extra amount per FSM pupil 1,498*** 2,011*** 
Extra amount per EAL pupil 213.6*** 470.0*** 
Extra amount per SEN pupil with statement 9,961*** 9,996*** 
Extra amount per SEN pupil without statement 340.0*** 441.7*** 
Extra amount per boarder –69,462*** –97,642*** 
Extra amount per nursery pupil 1,688*** 1,853*** 
Extra amount for being a VA/VC school –11,287*** –10,005*** 
Extra amount for being a foundation school –13,905*** –14,743** 
Constant 112,185*** 140,711*** 
  
Number of observations 16,721 16,721 
Number of local authorities 150 150 
Notes: Figures are coefficients from a least-squares regression of school funding levels on selected school 
characteristics. Asterisks denote statistical significance: * = 10% level; ** = 5% level; *** = 1% level. 
EAL – English as an additional language; FSM – free school meals; SEN – special educational needs; VA – voluntary 
aided; VC – voluntary controlled. 
Table A.2. Total funding for secondary schools, 2010–11 (2010–11 prices) 
 Fair-funding 
formula 
All funding 
Base per-pupil amount 3,320*** 3,565*** 
Extra amount per FSM pupil 2,264*** 3,418*** 
Extra amount per EAL pupil –17.93 88.76 
Extra amount per SEN pupil with statement 8,737*** 9,401*** 
Extra amount per SEN pupil without statement 286.1*** 405.9*** 
Extra amount per boarder 297.5*** 512.9*** 
Extra amount for being a VA/VC school –69,509*** –68,445*** 
Extra amount for being a foundation school –71,127*** –73,393*** 
Extra amount per sixth-form pupil –35.81 341.4*** 
Extra amount for having a sixth form 68,633** 40,299 
Constant 165,239*** 286,783*** 
  
Number of observations 3,055 3,055 
Number of local authorities 150 150 
Notes: Figures are coefficients from a least-squares regression of school funding levels on selected school 
characteristics. Asterisks denote statistical significance: * = 10% level; ** = 5% level; *** = 1% level. 
EAL – English as an additional language; FSM – free school meals; SEN – special educational needs; VA – voluntary 
aided; VC – voluntary controlled. 
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Table A.3. Responsiveness of total funding to changes over time in pupil 
characteristics: primary schools, 2010–11 (2010–11 prices) 
 All funding 
Base per-pupil amount 2,183*** 
Extra amount per FSM pupil 971.9*** 
Extra amount per EAL pupil 1,398** 
Extra amount per SEN pupil with statement 3,804*** 
Extra amount per SEN pupil without statement 209.8** 
Extra amount per boarder 24,692*** 
Extra amount per nursery pupil –1,546*** 
Constant –2,181 
  
Number of observations 16,631 
Number of local authorities 150 
Notes: Figures are coefficients from a least-squares regression of the annual change in school funding levels on the 
annual change in selected school characteristics. Asterisks denote statistical significance: * = 10% level; ** = 5% level; 
*** = 1% level. EAL – English as an additional language; FSM – free school meals; SEN – special educational needs. 
Table A.4. Responsiveness of total funding to changes over time in pupil 
characteristics: secondary schools, 2010–11 (2010–11 prices) 
 All funding 
Base per-pupil amount 1,662*** 
Extra amount per FSM pupil 2,084*** 
Extra amount per EAL pupil 91.60** 
Extra amount per SEN pupil with statement 8,667*** 
Extra amount per SEN pupil without statement 292.7*** 
Extra amount per boarder –159.7 
Extra amount per sixth-form pupil 0.0324*** 
Constant –39,198*** 
  
Number of observations 3,042 
Number of local authorities 150 
Notes: Figures are coefficients from a least-squares regression of the annual change in school funding levels on the 
annual change in selected school characteristics. Asterisks denote statistical significance: * = 10% level; ** = 5% level; 
*** = 1% level. EAL – English as an additional language; FSM – free school meals; SEN – special educational needs. 
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Table A.5. Average percentage changes by local authority under ‘Low Disruption’ 
option and different assumptions for the Area Cost Adjustment, relative to 
expected funding per pupil in 2014–15 under existing policy  
 No change in ACA Combined approach Updated GLM approach
Local authority  Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Inner London –3.0 1.4 –3.7 1.3 –1.1 3.3 
Camden 0.6 –2.5 –2.2 –5.3 2.8 –0.3
Hackney –2.9 0.2 –5.5 –2.6 –0.8 2.4 
Hammersmith and Fulham 3.5 7.2 0.6 4.3 5.7 9.6 
Haringey –9.7 –7.0 –3.1 0.0 –8.7 –5.9
Islington 9.9 10.5 6.9 7.4 12.2 12.9
Kensington and Chelsea –3.3 –4.8 –5.9 –7.4 –1.2 –2.8
Lambeth –5.5 –1.7 –8.1 –4.4 –3.4 0.4 
Lewisham 1.1 4.6 –1.5 1.8 3.3 6.8 
Newham –13.6 –1.6 –7.4 5.8 –12.7 –0.5
Southwark –9.5 –7.9 –12.1 –10.5 –7.5 –5.8
Tower Hamlets –1.9 6.9 –4.6 4.0 0.2 9.2 
Wandsworth 2.6 8.5 –0.2 5.5 4.7 10.7
Westminster 11.9 5.9 9.1 3.1 14.1 8.1 
Outer London –0.3 –0.3 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 
Barking and Dagenham 1.9 –0.5 9.0 6.8 3.0 0.6 
Barnet –2.9 –1.6 –4.2 –2.8 –1.8 –0.6
Bexley 3.8 –4.2 6.2 –1.7 4.9 –3.1
Brent –5.7 –6.4 –2.7 –3.2 –4.7 –5.4
Bromley 11.9 3.3 14.6 6.0 13.1 4.5 
Croydon –2.9 –5.3 –0.6 –2.8 –1.8 –4.1
Ealing –8.6 –1.7 –5.5 1.6 –7.5 –0.6
Enfield –6.6 –6.5 –4.3 –4.1 –5.5 –5.3
Greenwich 10.8 6.2 7.9 3.4 13.1 8.4 
Harrow 2.3 –9.8 1.1 –11.0 3.4 –8.9
Havering –2.1 –7.4 0.3 –5.0 –0.9 –6.3
Hillingdon –2.9 4.0 –4.2 2.7 –1.8 5.1 
Hounslow 6.0 5.8 4.5 4.5 7.1 6.9 
Kingston upon Thames –4.0 0.8 –5.3 –0.5 –3.0 1.9 
Merton –2.9 12.2 0.2 15.8 –1.8 13.3
Redbridge 3.7 6.6 6.1 9.1 4.8 7.7 
Richmond upon Thames 0.3 –2.7 –1.0 –4.2 1.4 –1.4
Sutton 5.0 10.1 3.6 8.8 6.2 11.3
Waltham Forest –6.9 –4.5 –4.6 –2.2 –5.8 –3.5
East Midlands 3.8 1.7 4.6 2.6 3.3 1.1 
Derby –1.3 1.1 –0.4 2.2 –1.9 0.3 
Derbyshire 7.7 9.1 8.7 10.2 7.0 8.3 
Leicester –1.9 1.7 –1.0 2.6 –2.0 1.5 
Leicestershire 1.6 –0.9 2.4 0.0 1.5 –1.1
Lincolnshire 6.1 –1.4 7.1 –0.3 5.4 –2.1
Northamptonshire 9.3 3.5 9.1 3.3 8.7 2.7 
Nottingham 2.2 –1.2 3.2 0.0 1.7 –1.7
Nottinghamshire 0.0 –1.3 1.0 –0.1 –0.5 –1.8
Rutland –1.7 –0.7 –1.0 0.1 –1.7 –0.9
East of England 3.9 0.3 2.8 –0.6 3.9 0.1 
Bedford Borough 2.4 2.6 –0.2 0.1 1.5 1.6 
Cambridgeshire 7.3 7.9 5.4 6.2 7.7 8.2 
Central Bedfordshire –0.5 2.4 –3.1 –0.1 –1.3 1.4 
Essex –0.6 –5.4 –1.0 –5.7 –0.5 –5.4
Hertfordshire 10.5 0.3 7.5 –2.6 11.2 0.9 
Luton –9.1 –5.6 –11.4 –7.9 –10.0 –6.5
Norfolk 7.3 4.9 8.2 5.9 6.6 4.2 
Peterborough 3.8 –0.5 2.1 –2.1 4.2 –0.3
Southend-on-Sea 2.7 0.4 3.2 1.0 2.7 0.4 
Suffolk 1.4 –0.7 2.3 0.4 0.8 –1.4
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 No change in ACA Combined approach Updated GLM approach
Local authority  Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Thurrock 2.4 4.3 0.4 2.2 2.5 4.3 
North East –2.7 –4.5 –1.8 –3.5 –3.4 –5.2
Darlington 8.7 –1.8 9.8 –0.7 8.0 –2.5
Durham –2.3 –7.0 –1.4 –6.0 –3.0 –7.7
Gateshead –2.0 –8.5 –1.1 –7.5 –2.7 –9.3
Hartlepool 0.3 –2.3 1.2 –1.2 –0.4 –3.1
Middlesbrough –4.8 –8.7 –3.9 –7.9 –5.4 –9.2
Newcastle upon Tyne –4.3 –9.9 –3.3 –8.9 –4.9 –10.6
North Tyneside –2.5 –6.1 –1.5 –5.1 –3.1 –6.8
Northumberland –2.9 4.0 –2.0 5.1 –3.5 3.2 
Redcar and Cleveland –4.3 –1.4 –3.4 –0.3 –5.0 –2.1
South Tyneside –2.7 –4.8 –1.7 –3.8 –3.3 –5.6
Stockton-on-Tees –1.3 –5.4 –0.4 –4.5 –2.0 –6.0
Sunderland –7.3 –5.8 –6.3 –4.8 –7.9 –6.5
North West –0.6 –2.1 –0.2 –1.6 –1.0 –2.6
Blackburn with Darwen –2.8 –6.8 –1.9 –5.8 –3.5 –7.5
Blackpool 2.9 1.5 4.0 2.6 2.1 0.7 
Bolton 5.7 –3.7 5.8 –3.6 5.8 –3.6
Bury –3.2 1.8 –3.2 2.0 –3.1 1.9 
Cheshire East 2.3 0.8 1.9 0.5 1.0 –0.7
Cheshire West and Chester 1.3 6.8 1.0 6.5 0.0 5.2 
Cumbria 3.0 6.4 3.9 7.5 2.4 5.6 
Halton 2.0 –7.1 1.6 –7.7 0.6 –8.1
Knowsley 5.5 –1.7 6.6 –0.4 5.3 –2.0
Lancashire –0.4 –2.7 0.6 –1.6 –1.0 –3.4
Liverpool –7.1 –11.5 –6.1 –10.4 –7.4 –11.8
Manchester –6.4 –3.4 –6.4 –3.3 –6.3 –3.3
Oldham 2.2 –6.6 2.2 –6.7 2.3 –6.5
Rochdale –3.0 –6.0 –3.0 –6.0 –2.9 –5.9
Salford 3.6 0.1 3.6 0.2 3.8 0.1 
Sefton –6.5 –6.3 –5.5 –5.1 –6.7 –6.6
St. Helens –2.4 –7.4 –1.3 –6.4 –2.6 –7.6
Stockport 4.7 6.0 4.7 6.2 4.8 6.1 
Tameside –2.4 –0.4 –2.4 –0.5 –2.3 –0.2
Trafford –5.0 –6.6 –5.0 –6.6 –4.9 –6.5
Warrington 1.8 5.8 1.5 5.6 0.5 4.4 
Wigan –7.9 –8.1 –7.9 –8.0 –7.8 –8.1
Wirral 4.9 –0.4 6.1 0.8 4.6 –0.7
South East 3.4 3.3 1.3 1.2 3.8 3.6 
Bracknell Forest 10.2 7.4 5.6 2.9 12.1 9.2 
Brighton and Hove –0.5 –5.4 –0.4 –5.4 –1.3 –6.2
Buckinghamshire 3.8 15.8 0.0 11.7 5.0 17.1
East Sussex 4.1 5.3 4.2 5.5 3.3 4.4 
Hampshire 5.2 7.5 3.5 5.9 5.3 7.5 
Isle of Wight –10.2 7.4 –11.8 5.7 –10.0 7.4 
Kent 1.0 –5.7 1.1 –5.6 0.7 –6.0
Medway 2.3 –3.6 2.7 –3.3 1.9 –3.9
Milton Keynes 2.5 –0.4 –1.4 –4.1 3.7 0.7 
Oxfordshire 5.0 1.8 1.6 –1.4 5.5 2.2 
Portsmouth 4.6 6.3 2.9 4.7 4.6 6.3 
Reading 4.5 7.4 –2.1 0.9 5.9 8.7 
Slough 4.2 –3.6 0.0 –7.6 5.9 –2.0
Southampton 8.1 0.7 6.4 –0.8 8.1 0.6 
Surrey 8.0 9.2 3.3 4.6 9.8 11.0
West Berkshire 7.8 4.7 1.1 –1.8 9.3 6.0 
West Sussex –4.4 –0.1 –4.5 –0.1 –4.8 –0.6
Windsor and Maidenhead 7.3 4.3 2.7 –0.1 9.1 6.0 
Wokingham 2.3 6.0 –4.2 –0.7 3.7 7.3 
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 No change in ACA Combined approach Updated GLM approach
Local authority  Primary Secondary Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
South West 4.7 –0.5 4.8 –0.2 4.3 –1.0
Bath and North East Somerset 7.4 0.2 5.8 –1.2 7.1 –0.1
Bournemouth 1.2 0.1 2.2 1.0 0.4 –0.6
Bristol City of 2.8 –4.0 1.4 –5.3 2.5 –4.4
Cornwall 0.6 –4.5 1.5 –3.5 –0.1 –5.2
Devon 5.0 –0.2 6.0 0.9 4.3 –0.9
Dorset 4.2 0.7 5.2 1.8 3.5 0.0 
Gloucestershire 7.4 –0.1 7.1 –0.3 6.8 –0.8
North Somerset 6.1 6.3 4.7 4.9 5.9 6.0 
Plymouth 6.8 –2.8 7.8 –1.9 6.1 –3.5
Poole 5.1 –6.5 6.2 –5.5 4.3 –7.2
Somerset 3.2 1.9 4.1 3.0 2.5 1.2 
South Gloucestershire 12.7 4.9 11.2 3.6 12.5 4.6 
Swindon 3.9 0.9 3.5 0.6 4.3 1.3 
Torbay 4.0 –2.6 5.1 –1.5 3.3 –3.3
Wiltshire 2.6 –2.8 2.2 –3.0 3.1 –2.4
West Midlands –2.7 –1.5 –2.4 –1.1 –3.4 –2.3
Birmingham –8.9 –4.1 –9.0 –4.2 –9.7 –5.0
Coventry –6.8 –8.1 –6.9 –8.2 –7.6 –9.0
Dudley –5.9 –1.8 –6.1 –1.9 –6.8 –2.8
Herefordshire –3.3 –7.4 –2.4 –6.3 –3.9 –8.1
Sandwell –6.5 3.2 –6.6 3.2 –7.3 2.3 
Shropshire 2.1 –5.8 3.0 –4.8 1.4 –6.6
Solihull 0.8 3.2 0.6 3.1 0.0 2.2 
Staffordshire 0.6 –1.5 1.6 –0.4 –0.1 –2.2
Stoke-on-Trent 3.6 0.3 4.7 1.3 2.9 –0.3
Telford and Wrekin 5.0 –0.6 6.0 0.5 4.3 –1.3
Walsall –8.0 –2.9 –8.1 –3.0 –8.8 –3.9
Warwickshire 8.5 9.2 8.2 9.1 8.2 8.9 
Wolverhampton –8.0 –12.4 –8.2 –12.5 –8.9 –13.2
Worcestershire 1.4 0.9 2.4 1.9 0.7 0.1 
Yorkshire and Humber –3.0 –3.8 –2.2 –2.9 –3.4 –4.3
Barnsley –9.0 –3.5 –8.1 –2.4 –9.6 –4.2
Bradford –12.9 –4.7 –12.2 –4.0 –13.0 –5.0
Calderdale –1.9 –0.1 –1.2 0.6 –2.1 –0.3
Doncaster 1.4 –6.1 2.4 –5.1 0.7 –6.9
East Riding of Yorkshire 0.9 –2.0 1.8 –0.9 0.2 –2.8
Kingston upon Hull City of 1.5 1.1 2.5 2.2 0.8 0.3 
Kirklees –6.0 –0.2 –5.4 0.6 –6.2 –0.4
Leeds –1.4 –5.4 –0.8 –4.7 –1.6 –5.7
North East Lincolnshire –7.4 –7.9 –6.5 –7.2 –8.0 –8.5
North Lincolnshire 4.8 –1.4 5.8 –0.3 4.1 –2.2
North Yorkshire –0.2 –5.9 0.7 –4.9 –0.8 –6.7
Rotherham –4.8 –12.7 –3.8 –11.8 –5.5 –13.4
Sheffield 1.5 –0.2 2.5 0.9 0.9 –0.9
Wakefield –3.1 –4.1 –2.6 –3.3 –3.3 –4.3
York –1.6 –0.5 –0.6 0.6 –2.2 –1.2
 
